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American law-in particular, American administrative law-grants
citizens extensive rights to participate in government decision-making.
Those rights kick in (subject to exceptions I'll talk about later) whenever
a government entity engages in "rule-making" as defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. That happens a lot: Rule-making takes place
whenever an entity of the U.S. government (other than Congress or the
courts) engages in the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a document
with "future [legal] effect designed to implement ... or prescribe law or

policy."' The category of rule-making covers almost all non-adjudicative government action; the Administrative Procedure Act defines the
categories of rule-making and adjudication so that nearly all federal government decisions fall into one category or the other.'
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. I'm grateful for the comments and suggestions
of Jessica Litman, Steven Winter, Kirsten Nussbaumer, A. Michael Froomkin, Noah Hall,
Gregory Fox, Brandon Hofmeister, Justin Long, Christopher Lund, John Rothchild, Alan Schenk,
and Robert Sedler.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)-(5) (2006). Other U.S. government entities whose actions do not
constitute APA rule-making include territorial governments, the government of the District of
Columbia, certain military authorities, and the president. Id. at § 551(1); Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (6)-(7) (defining "adjudication" as agency process for the formulation

of the "disposition ... of an agency in a matter other than rule making").
American law also mandates important participation rights outside of rule-making. See infra
notes 54-58 and accompanying text (participation rights under the Due Process Clause). For an
extensive discussion of the idea that fairness in civil adjudication demands participation by those
who are to be bound, see Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181,183
(2004).
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When the federal government engages in rule-making, as a general
matter it must engage in a series of procedural steps. It must give the
public advance notice of its intended action.4 It must give members of
the public "an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments." 5 And it must issue a written opinion articulating reasoned responses to any significant points that
those public comments raise. As the D.C. Circuit put it, "a dialogue is a
two-way street: the opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the
agency responds to significant points raised by the public." 6 Indeed,
even when an agency has not proposed to do anything, should an interested person request that it issue a rule, the agency is legally obliged to
respond to that request on the merits.7
American law, in other words, imposes two requirements on government in connection with public participation in rule-making (the socalled notice-and-comment process). First, government must make it
possible for members of the public to express their views, submitting
argument and information, in advance of government action. This
opportunity for citizen involvement in the decision-making process is
notable. But the second requirement is equally important: Government
decision-makers are obligated to attend to that public input, to consider
it on the merits, and to respond. The public's engagement with government in rule-making is thus marked by a two-way dialogic commitment,
in which government decision-makers may not simply ignore the arguments raised by citizens. Rather, they must engage with them and
respond. I'll refer to citizens' entitlement to such consideration as the
"right to be taken seriously."
The Administrative Procedure Act is only one source of American
law reflecting a right to be taken seriously. Environmental law provides
other examples. Before a federal government agency takes action that
will significantly affect the environment, it must distribute a draft environmental statement; citizens can then submit responses to that statement, and the government is barred from taking action until it issues a
revised document responding to all "responsible" opposing viewpoints.8
3. Again, there are exceptions. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) ("General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register .... ").
5. Id. at § 553(c).
6. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977). The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this holding. See, e.g., Interstate
Natural Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 494 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
7. See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 115-16 (D.D.C. 1995); In re Am.
Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
8. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9, 1503.1, 1503.4 (2011); Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of
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Before an agency can issue a major source permit under the Clean Air
Act, it must seek public comment, and it has "an obligation to respond to
significant public comments." 9 Here too, we see the same two-way
exchange of citizen comment and government response."1
This sort of interaction has been getting a lot of academic attention
lately, as internet communication has begun to transform agencies' rulemaking processes."' Today, agencies can solicit online, and citizens can
file and read online, comments on proposed agency action. Some have
urged that internet communication can enable fundamental changes to
the way that agencies make law. 2 To a significant extent, scholars have
approached this matter on a nuts-and-bolts level, asking about the effects
of internet communication on the mechanics of the notice-and-comment
process.13
In this article, I'll engage in a more theoretical examination. After
setting out the legal basis of the right to be taken seriously, I'll pose the
question why we might value it. The first part of the answer is the easiest: Mechanisms such as notice-and-comment help agencies make better
decisions. The next part, though, is harder: Does the presence of a right
to be taken seriously make our government institutions more democratic? Commentators assume that it does. But standard theories of
democracy and administrative law, I will argue, don't provide satisfying
basis for that conclusion.
I argue nonetheless that a more satisfying basis exists, and that to
see it, we should focus less on the individual's ability to comment than
on the government's obligation to hear, engage, and respond. That
requirement puts governors and governed in a discursive relationship. It
Mass Participationfor Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 190-91
(1997).
9. Onyx Envtl. Servs., CAAPP No. 163121AAP (EPA Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/r5/r5ard.nsf/8a853ab744d5 10c68625745800533fd5/06b0e9b20649a 123862574c
8006fd I d7/$FILE/Onxy%20final.2-1-06.pdf.
10. For other examples, see infra note 74 (consumer protection law); 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2006)
(telecommunications law).
11. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF FED. E-RULE-MAKING, ACHIEVING
THE

POTENTIAL:

THE

FUTURE

OF FEDERAL

E-RULE-MAKING

1 (2008), available at http://

ceri.law.comell.edu/documents/report-web-version.pdf; CARY COGLIANESE, FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1-2 (2011), available at http:/lwww.

acus.gov/wp-contentluploadsldownloads/201 1/08/Coglianese-Report.pdf; Cynthia R. Farina et al.,
Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 399-400 (2011); CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER ET AL.,
ASSESSING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AN OPEN GOVERNMENT ERA: A REVIEW OF FEDERAL

AGENCY PLANS 46 (IBM Center for the Business of Government ed., 2011), available at http://
www.govexec.com/pdfs/082211jml.pdf; Nina A. Mendelson, Rule-making, Democracy, and
Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1344-45 (2011).

12. See e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J.
433, 473 (2004).
13. See, e.g., LUKENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 46.
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compels the state to engage in communicative, reason-based discourse
rather than the mere exercise of power. The government's obligation to
show respect, to treat commenters as democratic citizens rather than as
objects of paternalistic control, is at the heart of the right to be taken
seriously and its democratic bona fides.
But there is a catch. This article grounds the democratic function of
the right to be taken seriously in a theoretical understanding of democracy (in part, in Habermas's conception of communicative rationality).
Is that theory reflected in the everyday practice of notice-and-comment?
The answer is no, not really. In practice, agencies are often swamped by
comments and pay serious attention to only some of them. They attend
to those comments filed by repeat players with instrumental power and
may send the rest off to outside contractors to be ignored. While the
institution of notice-and-comment, even in this limited form, has value
in bringing information to the eyes of the agency, it's harder to argue
that it's meaningfully democratic or democratizing.
I think there's more to understand in this gap between theory and
practice. To help illuminate it, I'll turn to some history. The right to be
taken seriously isn't really new; it isn't just a product of post-WWII
environmental and administrative law statutes. It echoes, rather, a striking and neglected precedent: the historic understanding of the right of
the people, guaranteed by the First Amendment, "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 4 This historic petition right was initially understood to incorporate the same dialogic commitment as the
modem right to be taken seriously: citizen expression of policy views
coupled with a government obligation to attend to that input, to consider
it on the merits, and to respond. That understanding of the Petition
Clause has been almost entirely forgotten today, but it underlay a wealth
of petitioning activity in the early United States.
The demise of that older understanding of the Petition Clause
related in part to conflict over whether the 1840s Congress was obliged
to receive and respond to petitions relating to the abolition of slavery.
More importantly, the old understanding of petition died because it
emerged from a pre-liberal political culture marked by an unmediated
politics of "public faith" and reciprocal obligation. It was rootless and
unenforceable in the new nineteenth century world of mass politics, in
which voting came to be the key link between citizen and government.
The right to be taken seriously, though, spoke to a need encoded in
our political DNA. It reappeared in modem administrative law, accompanied by a new enforcement mechanism: the courts' authority to
14. U.S.

CONST. amend.

I.
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reverse agency decisions where the agency had not adequately addressed
facts and arguments raised in public comments. Commenters didn't have
to rely on the agency's listening to them as a matter of grace or social
role. Yet that enforcement mechanism turned out to be too blunt an
instrument. Courts cannot compel agencies to attend to all comments;
those that best reflect mass public sentiment are in one respect the most
easily ignored.
The right to be taken seriously is appealing because it forces government to respond to citizens dialogically-that is, to respond as if the
relationship between government and citizen were the same sort of
human relationship we have in those aspects of everyday life not driven
by marketplace or government authority. Yet it has always strained
beyond the limits of legal enforceability. Its lack of an effective enforcement mechanism doomed it in the mid-nineteenth century. Modern
administrative law provides judicial enforcement, but we face a contradiction in using judicial review to make government act in non-instrumental ways.
The institution of notice-and-comment does a notable job of simulating a dialogic, discursive relationship in which government must
show the citizenry the respect of explaining itself-of hearing public
comments and responding to them directly. That sort of relationship
builds connection because it creates a sense that governors and governed
are part of a shared community. But it's not really true. The point of
judicial review is to compel agency staffers to write responses to the
substance of public comments by threatening that otherwise they'll be
reversed. There is no way to avoid the instrumental nature of that mechanism. In the end, that undercuts the democratic connection that the right
to be taken seriously might otherwise make.
In Part I of this article, I will describe the legal basis for the right to
be taken seriously in current law. In Part II, I will discuss the doctrine's
role in promoting more accurate agency decision-making. In Part III, I
will briefly consider its role in advancing perceived government legitimacy, and in Parts IV, V, and VI, I will speak more deeply to the connection of the right, in theory, with democratic practices and values. In
Part VII, I will turn to the question of whether these theoretical goods
are advanced in practice. In Part VIII, I will turn to the historical petition
right. In Part IX, I will describe the inherent limitations of a dialogic
conception of the right.
I.

THE

APA

AND THE MODERN RIGHT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY

The Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946, a compromise end to a long-fought battle over regulation of the American admin-
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istrative process. "[D]esigned to set forth minimum procedural
essentials" for certain agency functions, 15 it imposed relatively few strictures on policy-makers.' 6 It did introduce a new concept into the law:
that of "informal rulemaking."' 7 Under § 553 of the Act, certain agency
rule-making activities were subject to congressionally-imposed procedural requirements, designed to ensure that "the legislative functions of
administrative agencies shall so far as possible be exercised only upon
public participation on notice."' 8 These requirements were characterized
as "informal," more forgiving than those of the trial-type hearing.' 9
Which activities are subject to § 553 requirements? The APA
defines § 553 "rule making" to mean the "agency process for formulating, amending or repealing a rule," and defines "rule" to include "an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."2 That's a
broad category: Since the APA goes on to describe "adjudication" as
"agency process for the formulation of ... a final disposition ... in a
matter other than rule making,"'" it appears that essentially all agency
action can be divided into the categories of (generalized, forward-looking, policy-oriented) rule-making and (individualized, backward-looking) adjudication.
Only some of that rule-making is subject to the APA's procedural
requirements. The statute exempts from those requirements all rule-making that relates to "a military or foreign affairs function of the United
States," or to "agency management or personnel" or to "public property,
loans, grants, benefits or contracts."2 2 That last exception looks potentially huge, but courts have construed it narrowly, and agencies commonly decline to invoke it, following § 553 requirements even where it
would otherwise apply.23
The statute also exempts "interpretive rules," "general statements
of policy," and "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."2 4
15. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 313

(1946).
16. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 258, 277 (1978).

17. See id.
18. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, at 257.

19.
20.
21.
22.

See Verkuil, supra note 16, at 277-78 & n.103.
5 U.S.C. § 551(4)-(5) (2006).
Id. at § 551(6)-(7).
Id. at § 553(a).

23. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW

SYSTEM 555 (6th ed. 2009); Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participationin Federal Rulemaking
Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 551
(1970); see, e.g., Vigil v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 931, 937 (10th Cir. 1982).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
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Courts trying to figure out where those exceptions apply have described
them as "enshrouded in considerable smog"' 2 - the distinctions are
"tenuous," "fuzzy," "blurred," and "baffling. '26 Their gist is that APA
notice-and-comment requirements apply when an agency creates new
law, rights, or duties but not when it merely notifies the public about its
intentions or its understanding of the law.17 But the bottom line for our
purposes is that even taking these exceptions into account, § 553
requirements apply to a broad sweep of agency activity. And those activities are important. 2010's Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, for example, required for its implementation 240
separate rule-makings establishing new legal requirements on the part of
eleven agencies.28
Next, what does § 553 require? As set out in the statute, its
demands don't seem onerous. The agency must publish notice of its proposed rule-making, describing the substance of the proposed rule or the
subjects and issues involved. 29 It must give interested persons "an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments."' 3° It must consider that material and must
incorporate in the ultimate rule "a concise general statement of [the
rule's] basis and purpose."'"
The statutory text, thus, requires the agency to allow members of
the public to comment on proposed rules. And the courts, in a series of
cases, have required agencies to describe proposed rules with sufficient
accuracy and in sufficient detail and to provide sufficient background
materials to enable members of the public to file informed, on-point
comments and objections.3 2 But what about the second component of
the right to be taken seriously-the government's obligation to attend to
that input, to consider it on the merits, and to respond? I can imagine the
reader pointing out at this point that that's not in the statute. The statute
requires the agency to consider the material but apparently not to
respond, and there's no indication in the text of the statute of how a
member of the public could seek to enforce her right to the "considera25. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Am.
Bus Ass'n v. ICC, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
26. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
27. See Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d at 1565; see generally Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative
Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381.
28. See Farina et al., supra note 11, at 401.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
30. Id. at 553(c).
31. Id.
32. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 449-54 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
80 U.S.L.W. 3716 (U.S. June 29, 2012); see also infra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
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tion" that the statute mandates. So where do I get my asserted "right to
be taken seriously"?
The answer lies in the courts' interpretation of the Act. It begins
with the APA's empowering courts to overturn agency decisions on the
ground that those decisions are "arbitrary" or "capricious." 3 3 Imagine
that a challenger attacks a particular agency action in court as "arbitrary." What does that mean, exactly? The Supreme Court has explained
that arbitrariness is a function of the agency's reasoning process. A decision is arbitrary, for example, if the agency has "relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, [or] offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before" it.34 The reviewing court is
required to look at the agency's reasoning in reaching its decision. And
how is the court to know what the agency's reasoning was? The Court
has required agencies to prepare written, contemporaneous rationales
setting out "adequate explanation" for their actions.3
In the context of a challenge to an agency rule, the agency's contemporaneous rationale must make clear "what major issues of policy
were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted
to them as it did."3 6 Based on the information in that document, the
court is positioned to decide whether the agency has rationally considered the objections made in the comments to its proposal and has reasonably disposed of them-otherwise, it could not know that the agency
had avoided arbitrariness. 37 The result is that an agency that wishes to
avoid having its rule vacated as arbitrary needs not only to solicit comments from the public but also to consider them and to respond to them
on the merits. 38
This judicial understanding didn't fall into place all at once. Before
the late 1960s, the extent of judicial review of agency rules was unclear,
and agencies could generally invoke justiciability claims to avoid direct
challenges.39 Agency attention to public comments was haphazard at
33. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
34. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
35. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see also
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
36. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
37. See id. at 341.
38. See Allied Local & Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2000); St.
James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Action on Smoking & Health v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
39. The Court shifted that status quo in cases beginning with Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,387
U.S. 136 (1967). See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Cl.KENT L. Rav. 1039, 1039 (1997).
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best.4" But by the mid to late 1970s, as judicial review of agency action
became more widespread and far-reaching, it became uncontroversial
that an agency promulgating a rule was required to "refer to relevant
submissions by interested parties and . . . rebut or accept these submissions in an orderly fashion."4 1 As one commentator then put it, the
agency is obligated "to answer cogent comment, and . . .to do so in
terms of the particulars of the record."4 The agency must explain how it
resolved the questions comments posed, for "[a]rbitrary decisionmaking
cannot be prevented if an administrator is allowed simply to ignore serious objections." 4 3 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit urged, without an obligation
that the agency respond to significant comments, the opportunity to
comment would be "meaningless.""
The courts have repeatedly reaffirmed this obligation.4 5 To be sure,
an agency need not respond to insignificant arguments.4 6 But if an
agency does not respond to significant comments, its decision-making
cannot be deemed rational.4 7 The agency's obligation is to "respond in a
reasoned manner to the comments received, to explain how the agency
resolved any significant problems raised by the comments, and to show
how that resolution led the agency to the ultimate rule."'4 8 Its obligation
to solicit and receive comments is "inextricably intertwined" with its
statutory obligation to issue an explanatory statement with each rule.4 9
40. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 23, at 529.
41. J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Linits of JudicialReview,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 381 (1974).
42. James V. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integrationof Law and Policy, 65 VA. L.
REV.

257, 271 (1979).

43. Id. DeLong described this requirement as part of a then-current "hybrid rule-making"
model. Id. The Supreme Court rejected aspects of hybrid rule-making in Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978) but never stepped back from the requirement
that agencies respond to comments.
44. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977). See also St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 35-36).
45. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am. v. FERC, 494 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. Browner, 16 F.3d 1246, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Heckler, 760
F.2d 1470; see also Mariano-Florentino Cu611ar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 411, 421 (2005).
46. See Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 1096; NRDC v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156,
188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Portland Cement Ass'n v Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir.
1973); CudLiar, supra note 45, at 421 n.37.
47. See Allied Local & Reg'l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
48. Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (quoting Rodway v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, J.L.
ECON. & ORG. ADVANCE ACCESS, 14 (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/
content/early/2012/04/19/jleo.ewst09.full.pdffml.
49. Action on Smoking & Health, 699 F.2d at 1216. But see Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make
the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 114-15 (2003)
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This right to be taken seriously is not constitutionally grounded. 50
Yet the idea that rule-making is a "dialogue" 5 '-a "two-way street"5 2 in
which government must not only solicit public comment, but indeed
consider it and respond on the merits-has become fundamental to post1970s administrative law and has expanded beyond the APA.53 In the
next few sections of this article, I will explore the bases for its appeal. In
the very next section, I'll cover the most straightforward and noncontroversial argument for the right to be taken seriously: that it increases the
accuracy of agency decision-making.
II.

ACCURACY

One goal underlying the right to be taken seriously is accuracy. The
case law sounds this theme not only with regard to rule-making, but
even more strongly in the adjudicatory context. Whenever the government seeks to deprive a person of a liberty or property interest, in a
context where her legal entitlement rests on consideration of her individualized facts, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that she be able to participate in the decision by
taking part in a hearing before a government arbiter. At that hearing, she
must be allowed to present her own evidence and arguments relating to
those facts and to rebut the evidence provided by the government.54
What drives that constitutionally mandated requirement of procedural due process? According to the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge, it's accuracy. 55 Whether process is "due," the Court has told
us, depends on a balancing test in which a key factor is the extent to
which allowing the contested procedural rights will increase the accuracy of the government's determination.5 6
(arguing that because the obligation to respond is not explicit in the APA's text, "there may thus
be good reason" to conclude that it does not exist; that an obligation to respond to every comment
would be "cumbersome" and "conceptually unstable"; and that as a result, the control of informal
rule-making through the adjudication-inspired idea of private comments is a weak formality).
50. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); see infra
notes 359-361 and accompanying text.
51. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829

(1977))
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
54. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
55. 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
56. The other factors relate to the importance of accurate decision-making in the particular
setting, as measured by the degree of hardship that an incorrect choice would impose, and the
financial cost of providing the procedural right. See id. at 334-35; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme
Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 28, 48 (1976); Solum, supra note 2, at
252-53.
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It's entirely sensible to believe that this sort of citizen participation
in government decision-making will increase accuracy; that, after all, is
what the adversary process is about. The Anglo-American system of justice is based on the notion that legal fact-finders are more likely to reach
correct results when the persons immediately affected by the decisions
and most knowledgeable about the facts are made familiar with the evidence that their adversaries will present to the fact-finders and are
allowed to rebut it and to present their own cases. That right is at the
heart of due process; it is particularized in the rights of confrontation and
cross-examination.1 7 It is "immutable in our jurisprudence" that "where
governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings," the individual must have a
full and fair opportunity to show that "the evidence used to prove the
Government's case . . . is untrue."58
Turning to government rule-making, it's reasonable there too to
believe that broad public involvement will increase the substantive quality of decisions. One can go back to Aristotle for the proposition that
broader participation in decision-making makes for better decisions.59
While any individual alone will have imperfect judgment, Aristotle
stressed, a larger, more broad-based body will have superior perspective,
for it can draw from the understanding of the collectivity and can bring
to bear important perspectives that decision-makers would otherwise
lack. "[A] feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse."' 60 In particular, the broad-based body will
bring to the problem a more useful range of views: "[T]he knowledge of
the house is not limited to the builder only; the user.., of the house will
even be a better judge than the builder, just as ...the guest will judge
better of a feast than the cook."' 6 1 Or as John Dewey put it, "[t]he man
who wears the shoe," not the shoemaker, "knows best that it pinches and
where it pinches. 6 2
Today, this insight is a commonplace. Various forms of "many57. The Court at one point traced these rights back at least as far as the Christian Bible. See
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 n.25 (1959) (quoting Acts 25:16: "It is not the manner of
the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to
face, and have license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him.").
58. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270 (quoting Greene, 360 U.S. at 496-97 (1959)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
59. See Jonathan Weinberg, Geeks and Greeks, 3 INFO 313, 329 (2001); see also Adrian
Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 18 (2009).
60. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk.Ill, at 121 (Benjamin Jowet trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1945).
61. Id. at 124.
62. JOHN DEWEY, The Problem of Method, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 187 (Debra Morris &
Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).
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minds argument" 63 (of which this is one) constitute the basis for prediction markets such as Intrade64 and such phrases as the "wisdom of
crowds. 65 In particular, this understanding is foundational in the development of open-source software. One of the key insights of open-source
development, after all, is the one that Eric Raymond dubbed "Linus's
law": "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.

66

There's good reason to believe that a right to be taken seriously in
government decision-making will increase the quality of that decisionmaking in a wide variety of contexts. Decision-makers routinely start the
day with incomplete information, unexamined biases, and a limited
sense of the possible. It's common, for example, for government agencies to be most responsive to large market players whose economic
interests are rooted in the status quo; an agency in the course of its everyday operations is likely to seek feedback from those well-established
and respectable players, but not from less established firms with new
business models. In that context, broad-based participation, bringing
insights from the guest as well as the cook,6 7 together with a mechanism

for ensuring that the decision-maker takes the broad-based input seriously, will push in the direction of better decision-making.68 A rule
requiring the agency to consider the comments of new entrants, as well
as those of established players, will contribute to an environment of
greater openness to pro-competitive policies.

9

None of this is earth-shattering. Sixty years after the U.S. first put
the APA notice-and-comment process in place, few would dispute that
63. See Vermeule, supra note 59, at 2.
64. See INTRADE, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2012). Prediction markets rely
on Condorcet's Jury Theorem, which tells us that larger, less-informed groups can, by aggregating
members' independent views, reach more accurate results than smaller, better-informed ones. See
generally Vermeule, supra note 59, at 2-6. I don't rely on Condorcet's theorem in this article. The
understanding of openness I've set forth does not involve decisions made directly through

aggregating the views of members of a broad-based group, but merely the ability of broad-based
groups to provide input to the ultimate decision-makers. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
The relevant insight there is Aristotle's, not Condorcet's.
65. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN
THE FEW AND How COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS
(2004); see also, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE
21 (2006).

66. Eric Raymond, Release Early, Release Often, in

THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR

(2000), available at http://catb.org/-esr/writingslhomesteading/cathedral-bazaar/arOls04.html
(last modified Sept. 11 2000).
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. See Beryl A. Radin & Terry L. Cooper, From Public Action to Public Administration:
Where Does It Lead?, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 167, 167-68 (1989). See also Hilary Bok, They
Should Have Read Their Hayek . . . . OBSIDIAN WINGS (May 15, 2008), http://obsidianwings.
blogs.com/obsidian-wings/2008/05/they-should-hav.htmln
(noting the challenges to upward
information flow in top-down hierarchical organizations).
69. See Rossi, supra note 8, at 185.
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it's epistemically helpful for government agencies to solicit public comments.7" At this point, though, I have two caveats to offer. First, I am not
suggesting that broad-based input will guaranteegood decision-making.
For one thing, in a governance model characterized by openness as I've

described it, the broad-based public is not making decisions directly, but
is merely providing input to an ultimate decision-maker. Governance
rules may require the decision-maker to articulate reasons when it rejects
elements of that input, but that is the extent of the decision-maker's constraint. The fact that the decision-maker may not take the advice gener-

ated by broad-based participation (so that even good advice is for
naught) presents what Adrian Vermeule has referred to as an "epistemic
bottleneck. ' 7 1 My argument here, though, is that broad-based participa-

tion both makes better decision-making possible and, on the margin,
makes it more likely.
Second, increased broad-based participation will not always have a
helpful effect; it may have a negative one. Some, for example, have
warned that electronic filing of comments may "flood agencies with vast
quantities of public commentary" and "undermine or dilute the voice of
the public."7 2 Processing public inputs will demand agency resources.7 3

An agency may find itself devoting so much time and attention to outsider-initiated tasks that it is hampered in developing and pursuing its
own agenda.7 4
70. But see Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 246
(1973); infra Part VI. And to say that agencies should consider comments is not to say that there
should be judicial enforcement of that requirement; some argue that such a rule will routinely
frustrate legitimate agency action. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Response, The Courts and the
Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 550
(1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59,
69 (1995). The agency's obligation to consider public comment, according to those scholars, is
part of the red tape that is said to have "ossified" rule-making. For a recent skeptical view of the
ossification thesis, see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures
and BureaucraticPerformance: Is Federal Rulemaking "Ossified"?, 20 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 261. 261 (2010). See also Anne Joseph O'Connell, PoliticalCycles of Rulemaking: An
Empirical Portraitof the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 931-32 (2008).
71. See Vermeule, supra note 59, at 25.
72. Stuart W. Shulman, E-Rulemaking: Issues in Current Research and Practice,28 INT'L J.
PUB. ADMIN. 621, 623 (2005).
73. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 29 (1985).

74. Thus, for example, the Consumer Product Safety Act as initially drafted contained a
provision allowing any person to petition for a rule setting product safety standards, requiring the
agency to respond within 120 days, and providing that a decision not to initiate a rule-making
process would be reviewed de novo in district court. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L.
No. 92-573, § 10, 86 Stat. 1217 (1972) (repealed 1981). If the agency agreed to initiate a rulemaking, then it was bound to a complicated "offeror" process in which an industry entity,
consumer group, or private standards-writing organization would develop an initial proposed rule
for the agency to take as its starting point. See id. at § 7; Carl Tobias, Early Alternative Dispute
Resolution in a FederalAdministrative Agency Context: Experimentationwith the Offeror Process
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LEGITIMACY

What other goods does the right to be taken seriously serve? A
further answer is that it promotes government legitimacy. When I say
that, I'm not speaking to the normative or moral characteristics of government systems marked by notice-and-comment mechanisms. Rather,
I'm speaking descriptively about the attitudes citizens of such governments have: whether they perceive government institutions as legitimate
and therefore are willing to comply with legal commands. This is sometimes referred to as "sociological legitimacy." 7 5
Such legitimacy understandings derive from overlapping sources.
To some extent, the very fact that the right to be taken seriously promotes higher-quality decision-making will contribute to government
legitimacy: People are more likely to deem an institution legitimate if it
generates rules that work well. 6 Beyond that, the legitimacy of an institution and its decisions depends on the extent to which the institution fits
within established cultural accounts explaining its exercise of authority.
In our modern political culture, the legitimacy of a government decision
is often seen to rest on whether the decision was the product of meaningfully representative democratic procedures.7 7
The right to be taken seriously contributes to government legiti-

macy in the sense that a citizenry accustomed to such a right is more
likely to view its government as democratically responsive. As Will

Kymlicka has put it, "citizens will accept the legitimacy of collective
decisions that go against them, but only if they think their arguments and
reasons have been given a fair hearing, and that others have taken seriat the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 411-12 (1987). The
result, according to one informed observer, was "disaster"; the agency was "swamped in ...
unproductive investigations of useless subjects," plagued by delay, and deprived of the ability to
set its own agenda. See MASHAW, supra note 73, at 262-63 (footnotes omitted).
For more on electronic rule-making, see infra notes 228-249 and accompanying text.
75. See Jonathan Weinberg, Non-State Actors and Global Informal Governance: The Case of
ICANN, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas Christiansen &

Christine Neuhold eds., 2012) 292, 293. On sociological conceptions of legitimacy, see generally
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

(Walter W. Powell & Paul J.

MEYER & W. RICHARD ScoTr, ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY (1983); Robin Stryker, Legitimacy Processes as
InstitutionalPolitics: Implicationsfor Theory and Research in the Sociology of Organizations, in
DiMaggio

eds.,

1991);

JOHN

W.

ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS (Samuel B. Bacharach & Edward J. Lawler eds., 2000).

76. See Thomas Christiansen et al., Informal Governance in the European Union: An
Introduction,in INFORMAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 12-15 (Thomas Christiansen
& Simona Piattoni eds., 2003).
77. See WEINBERG, supra note 75, at 293; MEYER & SCOTr, supra note 75. The literature on
legitimacy is extensive and reflects competing schools of thought; I do not pretend to do it justice
here. For a somewhat different approach, see THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS (1990).
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ously what they have to say." 78 Theorists such as Kymlicka, who condemn aggregative or "vote-centric" conceptions of democracy and urge
that democracy must incorporate the deliberative generation of collective preferences, do so in part on the ground that voting without deliberation denies citizens the opportunity to persuade others of the merits of
their views, to shape consensus, or compromise. They also emphasize,
though, that voting without deliberation deprives those in the minority of
the sense of legitimacy that comes with the belief that those in the
majority at least considered their arguments seriously.79
It makes sense to think that a citizen expressing her views in
advance of government action, on the understanding that government
decision-makers are obligated to attend and respond, should feel greater
connection with that government. Her involvement is not limited to voting in infrequent elections; she can actually tell the government what to
do, and though the government is not required to follow her advice, it is
required on some level to pay attention to it. That creates a thicker fabric
of connection between members of the public and government decisionmakers. In that sense, her participation is, like voting, an "affirmation of
belonging." 8 Where people can participate in the government's decisional process and the government is obliged to attend to that participation, then, on the margin, the resulting 1sense of democratic
8
responsiveness should contribute to legitimacy.
IV.

DEMOCRACY

That the right to be taken seriously contributes to government legitimacy, fostering a psychological sense of democratic connection, isn't
too challenging a proposition. But that's a sociological judgment. Can
we go beyond that, and say that a right to be taken seriously makes
government structure more "democratic"?
Administrative law scholars seem to think so; they persistently
78. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 291 (2d ed.
2002).
79. See id. at 290-91; see also Rossi, supra note 8, at 187-88.
80. The language is from JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
INCLUSION 26 (1991). Shklar herself would not group this sort of participation with voting; her
theme in American Citizenship is that the franchise and economic independence hold a special and
singular status in American society as the key rights denied to antebellum slaves.
81. 1 have not yet taken up the disconnect between my discussion of notice-and-comment and
its reality. To the extent that the right to be taken seriously contributes to democratic legitimacy, it
is by virtue of its meaning for human beings seeking connection with their government. Yet the
benefits of participation in agency processes often inure to corporate entities for which
participation has no such psychological meaning. Further, there is reason to think that agencies are
more responsive to those business-entity comments than they are to the ones filed by ordinary
people. I discuss this at length in Part VI.
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refer to notice-and-comment as a democratic tool. A look at the literature finds scholars explaining that, by virtue of public participation in
notice-and-comment rule-making, agency rules are more nearly "democratic and thus essentially self-legitimating";82 that rule-making is itself
a "refreshingly democratic" process;83 that participation in rule-making
is a "democratic right[ ]";84 and that electronic rule-making represents

"online 'deliberative democracy.'"85 The literature reflects what appears
to be a widespread intuition that notice-and-comment is an exercise in
democracy. But is that correct? And if so, why?
In seeking to answer this question, we immediately run up against
the fact that different theorists have different conceptions of democracy.
C. Edwin Baker once broadly classed theories of democracy under the
headings of elitist, pluralist, and republican, and those categories will
work for our purposes here.86 Elitist democracies, for Baker, are entirely
vote-centric; the function of democratic institutions under this model is
to maximize the likelihood that leaders and bureaucrats will be competent and public-interested by providing a mechanism through which the
public can replace governments that are incompetent or corrupt. To
accomplish these ends, the governmental system must feature voting,
democratic accountability, and speech institutions to report on government malfeasance. Members of the public play their part on election
day.

87

Pluralist democratic theories, by contrast, demand more active citizen participation in government. They require that members of the public form interest groups, mobilize in defense of their shared interests,
and exert leverage in the political bargaining that shapes the polity's
laws and policies. For the liberal pluralist theorist, it is insufficient that
the citizen can vote; she must be able to lobby as well.88
Theorists of republican democracy, finally, challenge the liberalpluralist assumption that citizens can appropriately be divided into interest groups on the basis of their exogenous interests and preferences. For
these theorists, democracy should not simply aggregate individuals'
preferences without more. Rather, it must enable the thoughtful delibera82. Mendelson, supra note 11, at 1343.
83. Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory
Costs, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at 127, 129.
84. Noveck, supra note 12, at 517.
85. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process-for Better or
Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 469, 482 (2008).
86. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 129-43 (2002); see also

Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1133, 1139-40 (2011).
87. See BAKER, supra note 86, at 129-34.
88. See id. at 135-38; see also, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHo GovERNs?: DEMOCRACY
POWER

IN AN AMERICAN

CITY (1961).
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tion among citizens through which values are shaped, through which
citizens oriented to the common good can seek consensus.8 9
In this section of the article, I'll look at the connection of the right
to be taken seriously with elitist and pluralist theories of democracy.
Key strands of American political thought fall in this category, sometimes tending towards the elitist side of Baker's category divide. The
Federalists saw too-active popular participation in government as bound
up with the "mischiefs of faction" they sought to avoid.9" James
Madison, thus, while urging that government gains its legitimacy from
democratic representation, was wary of direct public control of policy.9 1
The goal of representation, he explained, is to
refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love
of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people
themselves, convened for the purpose. 92
More recent American political thought has been heavily influenced by a
vote-centric approach that takes the institutions of representative government and free speech as the key guarantors of a democratic polity, treating democracy as synonymous with elections. 93
As administrative law scholars have long realized, though, a voteor election-centric model of democracy faces profound challenges when
confronted with the administrative state. The problem is that administrative decision-makers are not elected. If I should disagree with the federal
government's position to grant or deny a particular media merger, my
only possible electoral response is to vote to throw out an entire presidential administration-but the lines of accountability between agency
and president may be blurry, and my vote for president will almost cer89. See BAKER, supra note 86, at 138-43;
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
91. See infra notes 314-315 and accompanying text.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 90. At the same time, Madison saw the people as the
ultimate check against wrongful action by their representatives. In such cases, it was "the duty, as
well as right, of intelligent and faithful citizens . . . to control [government actors] by the
censorship of the public opinion." JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE VIRGIIA RESOLUTIONS
(1800), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html.
In the end, public opinion was "the only effectual guardian of every other right." Id. See Colleen
Sheehan, Sound the Alarm to the People: James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and the Principles of
1798, LiBR. L. & LIBERTY (Apr. 17, 2012), http://libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/sound-thealarm-to-the-people-james-madison-thomas-jefferson-and-the-principles-of- 1798/.
93. See Tabatha Abu E1-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 7 (2011).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:149

tainly turn on other issues.9 4 Electoral mechanisms, transparency, and
free speech, without more, cannot guarantee the democratic bona fides
of agency action, and they do not mean that individual government decisions are responsive to the popular will.9 5
How to address this administrative "democracy deficit"?9 6 Under
the traditional model of (and justification for) agency decision-making,
agencies' policy-making was deemed democratically acceptable because
of the agencies' relationship to Congress.9 7 The law required administrative agencies to stay within the bounds of their statutory delegations; the
courts were there to enforce those limits. 98 Agencies were seen as adequately constrained by their obligation to justify their decisions, in open
proceedings, in terms of their instructions from Congress and the evidentiary record. 99
This traditional model lost favor, though, as it became apparent that
the agencies' statutory obligations imposed only limited constraints on
them-if an agency needed to show only that its actions were not arbitrary when considered in light of vague and broadly worded legislative
instructions and authorizations, then the agency was hardly constrained
at all. Instead, a second wave of theory in the 1960s and 70s came to see
administrative agency legitimacy through a proceduralist lens. The
administrative process was said to have legitimacy to the extent that all
affected interests were given fair access to agency decision-makers.
Under this model, dubbed "interest representation," administrative legality rested in policy-making that gave a role to all relevant interests by
giving them serious consideration in developing substantive policy.' 0 0
94. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187,
218-19 (2000). As Alan Morrison of Public Citizen once put it, "how many people in the world
do you think are going to decide whom to vote for ... based upon whether the Food and Drug
Administration went after drugs or not in Heckler v. Chaney?" Ronald M. Levin, Understanding
Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 738 n.240 (1990).
95. This is not a new point; much of U.S. administrative law scholarship has been devoted to
defending the administrative state from this attack. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 146 (4th ed. 1999); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 546 (2000); Weinberg, supra note 94, at 220.
96. Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn't-Attending to Rule-making's "Democracy Deficit"
98 CALIF. L. REv. 1351, 1353 (2010).
97. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1671-76 (1975); see also Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1334-35 (1984) (describing the "judicial review" model).
98. See Stewart, supra note 97, at 1673-74; Weinberg, supra note 94, at 221.
99. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 23, at 39.
100. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 23, at 41; Stewart, supra note 97, at 1712, 1722;
Weinberg, supra note 94, at 222; see also Frug, supra note 97, at 1359-61. This vision can be
analogized to John Hart Ely's understanding of constitutional adjudication, in which the role of
the courts is seen as "maintain[ing] access for all groups to a political process whose democratic
legitimacy consists precisely in its potential responsiveness to the wishes of those groups."
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This involved a shift to an explicitly pluralist model of democracy. It
based the legitimacy of the agency process, at least in part, on the possibility of citizen participation: on the ability of the public to make arguments to agencies and to have those arguments fairly considered.''
The interest representation model suggested that unmediated citizen
participation in agency decision-making (and thus the right to be taken
seriously) not only advances democracy but, indeed, is crucial to the
agency's democratic bona fides. But U.S. administrative law has largely
abandoned that model. On closer examination, it showed flaws. It
depended, for its legitimizing power, on there being some metric we
could use to tell when an administrative process "fairly" represents all
interests. Yet some groups are going to be more influential in agency
processes than others; on which occasions is that imbalance justified?"'
No agency can provide for unlimited participation given the needs of
managerial efficiency; how do we know which refusals to accept outside
1 3
input are appropriate, and which import subjectivity and arbitrariness? 1
This problem in determining whether an agency process has been
adequately pluralist, and thus legitimate, is reminiscent of the charge
leveled at Jon Hart Ely's proceduralist vision of constitutional law:'0 4
There is no way to tell whether the process has given adequate respect
and consideration to all interests other than by deciding whether one is
satisfied with its substantive outcomes. Nor is it clear why various
groups' ability to present their cases before the agency and a reviewing
court achieves goals of democratic accountability in the first place, when
the court can impose on the agency only limited constraints on its ultimate action.
U.S. administrative law thinkers have moved on from the interest
representation model, largely abandoning the notion that interest-group
participation should be deemed the source, or indeed should be the measure, of an action's legitimacy. More recently, they have emphasized
supra note 23; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
(1980); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 465-66 (2003).
101. See Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participationin
the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 526 (1972). As the interest representation model
took hold, administrative lawyers grappled with such questions as whether government should
fund the participation in agency proceedings of interest representatives who could not otherwise
afford to participate. See, e.g., Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation:
Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative
Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 906-09 (1982).
102. See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1498
MASHAW ET AL.,

OF JUDiciAL REVIEW

(1983).
103. See
104. See

supra note 73, at 29.
supra note 100.

MASHAW,
ELY,
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presidential control of the administrative process.'1 5 Presidential admin-

istration promises the benefits of accountability; under this approach,
responsibility for nearly every agency action can be laid at the President's doorstep. 0 6 It leaves untouched, though, the problem of demo-

cratic insulation noted earlier-when the only influence a citizen has
over the FDA's decision to approve a particular drug application is her

power to vote for the other party's presidential candidate in the next
election, she is armed with a very blunt instrument indeed.'0 7
So is it meaningful to say that agency rules are democratic by virtue
of public participation in notice-and-comment rule-making? One scholar
argues that notice-and-comment rule-making provides "an ingenious

substitute for the lack of electoral accountability of agency heads"
because it provides citizens with "a structured opportunity to provide
input," insulated from the corrosive effect of large campaign contribu-

tions.' 08 And yet the agency's insulation from the (messy, moneydriven) political process is not itself a token of democratic legitimacy.

Nor is there any reason to think that the comments filed in administrative proceedings reflect the distribution of public opinion.109 Finally,

public comments in notice-and-comment rule-making aren't especially
constraining; the agency needs only to respond to them, not to follow

their directions.'1 0
There are respects in which the notice-and-comment feature of
agency rule-making can be said to promote elitist or pluralist democ-

racy. To the extent that notice-and-comment makes government decision-makers more aware of and potentially more responsive to public

opinion, it is part of a larger collection of structural devices that
"increase the incentives and capacity of elites to act intelligently for the
105. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 100, at 485-91; Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994). For an
early articulation, see Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, I J.L. EcON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
106. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2245-53 (2001).
107. Indeed, given the lack of transparency in White House decision-making, some have
suggested that presidential control actually worsens the "democracy deficit." See Strauss, supra
note 96, at 1362.
108. Asimow, supra note 83, at 129. See also Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade:
An Empirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMtN. L. REv. 99, 100 (2011)
(describing notice-and-comment as among the "cornerstones that ensure an accountable and
democratically legitimate Fourth Branch").
109. Cudllar, supra note 45, at 473. Quite the contrary, Cudllar continues: Public contributions
to the notice-and-comment process generate perspectives that are so "extraordinarily skewed" that
they may defeat "the normative rationales for consulting people in the first place." Id. at 474.
110. Thus Beth Noveck's comment: "When, despite vociferous and voluminous public
opposition to lifting media cross-ownership restrictions, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) does so anyway, we are left wondering what purpose the notice and comment process
really serves." Noveck, supra note 12, at 448.
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public good" and facilitate the replacement of underperforming administrations. " ' Notice-and-comment processes can be said to advance democratically responsive decision-making simply because they put citizens'
information and policy views before government decision-makers who
might not otherwise be aware of them. There's democratic benefit in
decision-makers at least being able to hear from people who would otherwise be shut out of the discussion entirely. If bureaucrats are to act on
the basis of grievances shared by members of the public, it's necessary
first that people with grievances be able to get the word out-to communicate their concerns and their views.
Notice-and-comment can be said to advance pluralist democracy
more directly as another instantiation of the fight for power and influence that is democracy under the pluralist model-as the administrative
parallel of legislative lobbying. Administrative decision-makers are policy decision-makers; views expressed in comments can influence their
choices. But the analogy to legislative lobbying works only incompletely. In the pluralist vision, legislators respond to lobbying in order to
retain office. Administrators don't have the same accountability.
John Dewey once explained that if we are to have democracy rather
than oligarchy, the masses must "have the chance to inform the [government-manager] experts as to their needs."' 1 2 He didn't stop there,
though; he added that "the enlightenment must proceed in ways which
force the administrative specialists to take account of the needs.""' 3
Does notice-and-comment force the administrative specialists to take
account of public needs? Perhaps it's time to look farther afield, and to
examine other lenses through which notice-and-comment might be said
to be democratic.
V.

DISCOURSE

Let's turn to theories of republican or "deliberative" democracy. A
premise of deliberative democracy is that we cannot have a fair or morally legitimate political system simply through pluralist aggregation of
individuals' exogenous preferences without more. Rather, deliberative
democracy proceeds from Jurgen Habermas's argument that a political
system, to be legitimate, must enable meaningful participation by all
people affected by its decisions.' 14 I'm going to spend a couple of pages
111. BAKER, supra note 86, at 132.
112. JOHN DEWEY, THE POLITICAL WRTINGS 187 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds. 1993)
(excerpting Dewey's 1927 book THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS).
113. Id.
114. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 752, 759 (2003) (quoting Habermas's statement that a legal
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discussing Habermas's theory and the schools of thought it has inspired,
because that theory provides a plausible path (albeit one with a hairpin
turn) to a different appreciation of the right to be taken seriously.
Habermas's focus on the citizen's role in society follows from his
position that "discourse"-a mode of speech in which every member of
society can "take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for
truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument" I '5-is the only legitimate means by which society can formulate
moral norms. 11 6 In that discourse, each participant must be able to take
account of the interests and concerns of all others, modifying his interests in light of his understanding and recognition of others, and participating with them in good faith and on an equal and untrammeled
7 As Habermas
basis. "1
recognizes, this is a challenging standard for conversation in the public sphere, all the more because of "the repressive
and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power, structural
'18
violence, and systematically distorted communication."
Habermas does not suppose that day-to-day political decision-making can happen through the unstructured discourse spanning a nation's
public conversation." 9 Political decisions often appropriately rest on
bargaining and negotiation, forms of instrumental communication that
are not about the force of the better argument at all.' 2 0 Politics, he
explains, must therefore take place on two tracks. First is the informal
public sphere, in which untrammeled public discourse can identify and
interpret social needs; second are proceduralized institutional arenasparliaments, cabinets, political parties-specifically designed for political decision-making.' 2' Deliberation must take place in both spheres: "A
deliberative practice of self-determination can develop only in the interplay between, on the one hand, the parliamentary will-formation instituorder "owes its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which alone [its citizens' private and
political autonomy] can express and prove itself").
115. JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 198
(Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990); see Froomkin, supra note 114, at
771.
116. See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (articulating the discourse
principle).
117. See JORGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE
ETHICS 49 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., 1993).
118. HABERMAS, supra note 116, at 307-08; see also Kenneth Baynes, A Critical Theory
Perspective on Civil Society and the State, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 123, 138 (Nancy

Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002); Shane O'Neill, The Equalization of Effective
Communicative Freedom: Democratic Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond, 17 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 83, 87 (2004).
119. JAMES GORDON FINLAYSON, HABERMAS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 118-19 (2005).
120. See HABERMAS, supra note 116, at 285; Baynes, supra note 118, at 126.
121. See HABERMAS, supra note 116 at 307-08.
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tionalized in legal procedures and programmed to reach decisions and,
on the other, political opinion-building in informal circles of political

communication."

122

A wide range of modem thinkers, doing work classed under the

heading of "deliberative

democracy,"

have been influenced by

Habermas's work. 123 Among American legal academics, deliberative
democracy dovetails with a school of thought dubbed civic republicanism, 124 also featuring a vision of "frequent participation and deliberation

the sorts of values
in the service of decision, by the citizenry,' 2 about
5

according to which the nation will operate."'
Deliberative democrats, as the name suggests, see deliberation as
essential to legitimate political decision-making. ' 26 For this reason, they

prominently stress the importance of citizens' engaging in thoughtful
and discursive deliberation with each other-that is, with other members
of the public-about what government should do.'2 7 Their reasons for
doing so vary. Some proceed from Aristotle's perspective that political
involvement is the highest, most fulfilling form of human endeavor, and
thus is its own reward. 128 Others see consequentialist benefits in democratic deliberation that include public perceptions of governmental legit122. Id. at 275; see Baynes, supra note 118, at 127-28.
123. See JOSHUA COHEN, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY:
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17, 33 n.12 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989)
(explaining that three early presentations of deliberative-democracy theory overlap because they

"all draw on Habermas"). For introductions to the field, see generally DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
(Jon Elster ed., 1998); ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James
Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); JAMES FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE

DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? (2004); KYMLICKA, supra note 78; ETHAN J. LIEB, DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004).

124. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493-94 (1988); Frank

I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 36 (1986); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republication Justificationfor the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1514 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541
(1988). For another perspective, see Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993).
125. Cass Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AnF. 3, 4 (1991).
126. See David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law's Lessons for Deliberative
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2011).
127. See KYMLICKA, supra note 78, at 289-93.
128. Aristotle idealized political life as one in which all citizens-male, armed with the leisure
that wealth brings, educated to think along the paths of civic virtue, bound to the other members of
their small community by bonds of friendship and harmony, and putting the needs of the polis
above their own-shared in "the interchange of ruling and being ruled." AISTOTLE, THE POLITICS
258 (E. Barker ed. & trans.,1961); see DEREK HEATER, WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP? 55-56 (1999);
PETER RIESENBERG, CITIZENSHIP IN THE WESTERN TRADITION: PLATO TO ROUSSEAU

44-46 (1992).

These views find echoes in the work of modern thinkers. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION 258-59 (1963) ("[N]o one could be called either happy or free without participating,
and having a share, in public power.").
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imacy; better-quality decisions; the fostering of bonds of mutual
understanding, empathy, and respect
among citizens; and a more mean129
ingful role for minority groups.
This understanding of democracy has been widely championed in
American law. It is front-and-center in the work of Cass Sunstein 130 and
Bruce Ackerman.' 3 ' It is the basis for Robert Post's description of

democracy as resting on citizens' being able to participate in those
modes of communication that allow them collectively to "forge ...the

'public opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic

state.' ",132 Citing Habermas, Post describes the ultimate purpose of free
speech as that of enabling "the formation of a genuine and uncoerced

public opinion in a culturally heterogeneous society"-put another way,
enabling "a culturally heterogeneous society to forge a common demo1 33
cratic will."'

Do any of the theories just discussed provide a basis for concluding
that a right to be taken seriously, as I have described it, advances democracy, freedom, or normative government legitimacy? One might think
so. After all, these theories stress the importance for democracy of citizens' active public engagement with the issues of the day. But the short

answer to that question is no, not directly. Mechanisms such as noticeand-comment don't involve the sort of deliberation these theories
describe.
In general, deliberative-democracy theories imagine one of two
kinds of deliberation. 134 The first is deliberation among the people.' 35

That deliberation is not merely any "form of political talk,"''

36

but one

with particular characteristics. It is marked by some measure of equality;
no one person or advantaged group dominates.137 Participants engage
129. See KYMLICKA, supra note 78, at 289-93; Maeve Cooke, Five Arguments for Deliberative
Democracy, 48 POL. STUD. 947 (2000); Ponet & Leib, supra note 126, at 1250. See generally
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 123.

130. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985).
131. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
132. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7
(2000) (quoting Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d
Cir. 1917)).
133. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 639, 671
(1990) (citing 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 81-82 (Thomas

McCarthy trans., 1987)).
134. See Ponet & Leib, supra note 126, at 1249.
135. Id.
136. Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science,
11 ANN REV. POL. Sci. 497, 502 (2008).
137. See id. at 504-05.
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with each other, trying to convince each other. It is marked by an openminded search for a larger public good, rather than the selfish goals of
the participants. 38 The process of deliberation will cause participants to
39
rethink what they had believed to be their own goals and interests.
Deliberation, we are told, should lead most participants to "appreciate
the shallow basis for their prior views"; it is a process in which those
who seek to convince will have the "principal task . . . to ask good
questions, not to announce assertive conclusions. ' 140 This sort of deliberation, at its ideal, instantiates Habermas's practical discourse, which
grows out of "a good faith commitment to honest debate."'' "Once parties undertake to debate with one another nonstrategically, they embark
on a course that requires all affected parties to deliberate1 42together in a
reasoned conversation that aims at reasoned agreement."
Alternatively, deliberation can be seen to take place not among
ordinary people, but among elites with decision-making authority. 14 3 It
is focused on a decision that those deliberating persons will make as a
body. 144 The goal is the same as before, though: As the participants,
somewhat shielded from democratic pressures,' 45 seek to reconcile their
contrasting viewpoints, "a policy emerges
that can serve a more univer' 46
good."'
common
the
of
sal consensus
Notice-and-comment is neither of those things. It is neither communication among members of the public nor communication among elites.
Rather, it is communication across that line as members of the public
seek to influence agency decision-makers. Even more importantly, it is
not deliberative. There is little dialogue in notice-and-comment as it is
conventionally understood, little opportunity for members of the public
to engage with each other in any sustained way. There is no openness in
re-examining one's own views, no rethinking of one's own preferences.
138. For the characteristics of Habermasian discourse, see Froomkin, supra note 114, at
767-77. Some thinkers urge that so long as discourse is plausibly other-regarding on its face, and
the participants are actually seeking to convince (rather than, say, to bully), whether participants
are subjectively seeking to advance their narrow interests or to advance a common good is not
important. See Thompson, supra note 136, at 504-06. More often, though, deliberation theorists
foreground the pro-social motivation of the participants, emphasizing that deliberation either
begins with a search for the common good, motivates that search, or both. See, e.g., KYMLICKA,
supra note 75 (noting that deliberation motivates participants to focus on the common good);
COHEN, supra note 123, at 25 (same).
139. See Ricardo Blaug, New Theories of Discursive Democracy: A User's Guide, 22 PIuL. &
Soc. CRriTCISM 49, 51 (1996).
140. See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 131, at 183.
141. Froomkin, supra note 114, at 772.
142. Id.
143. See Ponet & Leib, supra note 126, at 1249.
144. See Thompson, supra note 136, at 502-04.
145. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 124, at 1540.
146. Id. at 1555.
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That, after all, isn't the point. There is no attempt to convince one's
peers-one's equals-within the group of the rightness of one's views.
That, too, is not the point. Notice-and-comment does not facilitate
consensus.
Each member of the public participating in a notice-and-comment
process has the instrumental task of convincing the agency-an authoritative decision-maker-of the correctness of that participant's positions.
This is not a mutual exchange in which the commenters "forge a common democratic will."' 47 Commenters talk past each other, not with
each other; they engage only insofar as is necessary to rebut each others'
1 48
views for the agency audience.
I'm not arguing in this section that there is anything wrong-or
right-with the notice-and-comment process as I'm describing it. My
point, rather, is that its merits have little to do with deliberative democracy.149 The goals of deliberative democracy are best served by deliberation-by citizens' engaging with each other in open discussion. Notice150
and-comment is something else.
VI.

RESPECT

So why this right to be taken seriously? My answer looks to the
respect that a democratic government should pay to each citizen's autonomy and equality. That respect- the government's obligation to treat
citizens as "intrinsically significant moral agents"-is at the core of participatory democracy.' 5 1 In that context, the striking part of the right to
be taken seriously is not the right of the individual citizen to offer views,
but rather the obligation of government to attend and respond. The
respect government owes to citizens is at the root of its obligation to
take their arguments seriously.
Fred Schauer once described judicial reason-giving as a sign of
147. Post, supra note 133, at 671.
148. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 12 (1997). To be sure, like-minded commenters may coordinate with one another for
strategic purposes-dividing up labor, agreeing on policy strategies, and so on. But this too is
other than republican deliberation.
149. Mark Seidenfeld has argued that notice-and-comment serves deliberative democracy
goals because it enables-or could enable-deliberation within the agency. See Seidenfeld, supra
note 124, at 1541-62. But he does not explain why we should see the agency's analytic processes
as deliberative, and his suggestions for promoting deliberation within the agency-including
having an agency "assign some staff members to interact with each different interest group and
* . .to see that interest group as their clientele,"-seem unrealistic. Id. at 1555.
150. I argue infra Part VII that Internet technology is not likely to make notice-and-comment
more deliberative.
151. BAKER, supra note 86, at 136.
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respect. 5 2 Why? A government that declines to give reasons is one that
relies on authority without more, "indicat[ing] that neither discussion
nor objection will be tolerated."1 5 3 By contrast, the giving of reasons
"bring[s] the subject of the decision into the enterprise," "opening a conversation rather than forestalling one." 1 54 A government that is required
to engage and to explain moves away from the mere instrumental exercise of authority; it is a government required to take its citizens seriously
and to manifest that relationship by engaging with them in two-way
communication.
We can see this more plainly through the lens of government legitimacy. 155 In Jeremy Waldron's narrative, the roots of liberal thought lie
in the Enlightenment's "determination to make authority answer at the
156
tribunal of reason and convince us that it is entitled to respect."'
Unless the social order can be justified, it cannot be legitimate; "the
basis of social obligation must be made out to every individual, for once
the mantle of mystery has been lifted, everybody is going to want an
answer."'' 57 In58 that sense, "[l]iberal, democratic politics is about
'
justification."'
Government, on this understanding, cannot legitimately speak to its
citizens purely in the instrumental voice of command. It is required to
give reasons whose point is to persuade, not to pronounce. Stephen
Macedo similarly argues that the moral core of the liberal order is an
open and conscientious commitment to public justification: "[L]iberal
citizens expect to be answered with reasons rather than mere force or
silence."'1 59 The government's obligation to provide reasons is thus a
matter of its respect for each citizen's capacities and agency.160 Bureaucrats' refusal to provide reasons would mean treating the populace as
"objects of paternalistic legislation rather than as democratic citizens to
152. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 658 (1995).
153. Id.
154. Id. For a somewhat different approach, see Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial
Opinion, in LAW'S STORMS: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996) (emphasizing the interplay of persuasion and hierarchical power in the
judicial opinion).
155. See Solum, supra note 2, at 288-89 (the values of dignity, equality and autonomy support
participation rights by virtue of their connection to legitimacy).
156. Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHrI. Q. 127, 134 (1987).
157. Id. at 135.
158. STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM

41 (1991).

159. Id. Macedo, to be sure, ties the notion of public justification to public discussion-the
"ongoing project of publicly interpreting, questioning, debating and reshaping" constitutional
government-rather than to notice-and-comment. Id. at 76.
160. This theme can be found in the work of both republican theorists and (some) pluralist
ones. Compare GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 123, at 21-22, with Waldron, supra note 156,
at 128.
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whom they owe an honest account of their actions." 16'
To flesh out this argument, it's useful to return to the work of
Habermas, who begins by distinguishing between communicative and
instrumental speech acts. 16 Communicative acts are mediated by discourse; instrumental (or strategic) acts bring about the desired end not
by persuasion but by other means. 163 The distinction here, in rough
terms, is that between persuasion on the one hand, and trick, threat or
bribe on the other.
Habermas goes on to draw a line between those spheres of social
'
life he calls "lifeworld" and "system."164
"Lifeworld" refers to the informal, non-marketized realm of social life, including household and family.165 Lifeworld is the home of communicative action. It provides the
social background, and the shared meanings and understandings, against
which communicative action can take place.16 6 The lifeworld is conducive to individual autonomy because it is based on mutual voluntary
persuasion (which is a vernacular way of expressing what Habermas
would call the "reciprocal recognition of validity claims"16 7 ); constraints

on individual autonomy in that sphere are self-imposed.
"System," by contrast, refers to the systems of money and power
that steer the market economy and state bureaucracy.168 System is the
home of instrumental action, mediated by economic and state power.
The instrumental goals that people find themselves serving here are for
the most part not their own; they are the goals of the systems and institutions in which they are embedded. Those instrumental goals may be
opaque to the people whose actions are steered by them and who work
to realize them. And the networks of instrumental power can encroach
upon realms of action and decision that properly ought to remain within
the relative autonomy of the lifeworld-in Habermas's language, the
system can "colonize" the lifeworld. 16 9

How is this relevant to the right to be taken seriously? I focused
161. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 123, at 45.
162. FINLAYSON, supra note 119, at 47-48.
163. Id. I am eliding, for simplicity, Habermas's distinction between instrumental and strategic
action. Instrumental action includes any act taken as a means to bring about the actor's desired
end; strategic action is a subset of instrumental action that involves achieving one's ends by
causing other people to do things. The key thing for this article's purposes, though, is the
difference between those categories and communicative action.
164. See 2 JOROEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATnVE ACTION 113-89 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987).
165. See FINLAYSON, supra note 119, at 51.
166. See HABERMAS, supra note 164, at 131-32; FINLAYSON, supra note 119, at 51-53.
167. FINLAYSON, supra note 119.
168. Id.
169. See FINLAYSON, supra note 119, at 53-56; HABERMAS, supra note 164, at 342-43.
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attention earlier on the government's obligation to attend and respond to
information offered in the notice-and-comment process. That obligation
puts governors and governed in a discursive relationship. As a citizen, I
have a right to comment on pending government action; the state, in
turn, must listen and explain. We can see that as bridging some of the
separation between governors and governed by putting us in a discourse
community. 70 Using Habermas's language, the obligation of the government to listen and give reasons is an obligation to engage in communicative rather than instrumental discourse-a small colonization of
system by lifeworld, rather than the other way round.171
Putting it another way: The pay-off in the right to be taken seriously doesn't lie in commenters engaging in discourse with each other.
Such discussions might be all very well, but they don't bridge the gulf
between government and citizenry. The payoff, rather, is that government is being forced to engage with what citizens say. The bureaucratic
subsystem cannot act merely authoritatively, announcing its mandates.
Instead, it must listen, consider citizens' actual arguments, and respond
with reasons that are responsive to those arguments, reasons that can
persuade. In short, it must engage in a form of discourse that steps
across the line dividing system from lifeworld.
What is democratic about notice-and-comment is not so much the
citizen's ability to comment. Certainly free speech is important (and
indeed vital to democracy). But the citizen's ability to weigh in on proposed agency action is of no more value in this regard than is any other
instance of free speech. What is democratic, rather, is the government's
obligation to attend, engage, and respond-that is, to give reasons. That
obligation, of course, is imposed as a matter of instrumental rationality:
The agency gives reasons so that it will not be reversed. But the point is
that the agency's instrumental-rationality obligations require it to listen,
to evaluate, to respond, to seek to persuade-to shift its orientation, if
only a little, from instrumental power to dialogic engagement.
For that, the judicial-review enforcement mechanism is necessary.
That too is consistent with Habermas's thought. Communicative action,
Habermas explains, can generate institutions and rules that constrain and
channel administrative processes. 72 Notice-and-comment is such an
institution. In that way, the public can influence
170. But see infra Part VIII.
171. Cf Jiirgen Habermas, What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and
the Need for New Thinking on the Left, 183 NEw LEFT REv. 3, 18-19 (1990) (emphasizing that
public action can change the relationship, and redraw the boundaries, between the
communicatively structured public sphere on the one hand and the bureaucratic subsystem on the

other).
172. See id. at 18.
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the evaluative and decision-making processes of public administration ...so as to bring its normative demands to bear in the only

language that the besieged stronghold understands: it cultivates the
range of arguments that, though treated instrumentally by administrative power, cannot be ignored by it, as much as administrative power
is conceived along constitutional lines.' 7 3
And in that manner, citizens, acting through the legislature, can structure
bureaucratic processes so as indirectly to bring "the self-programming
processes of state management
174

.

. .

back within the horizons of the

lifeworld."'
All this, though, is theory. What about practice? Does it work that
way in real life?
VII.

REALITY

There is reason to doubt that it does. Not all comments filed in
agency proceedings are equal; some get more attention than others. A
tremendous amount of influential communication with agencies takes
place not through the § 553 notice-and-comment process, but through
in-person ex parte contacts. This advantages well-funded and repeat participants, and disadvantages smaller, less well-funded entities that can't
afford to maintain staff roaming the agency hallways. Small companies,
"consumer interest groups and other 'undesirables'" can have difficulty
17 5
even scheduling meetings with agency key players.
This raises the possibility that my argument from democracy,
invoking the value of democratic connection between citizenry and government, is unmoored from reality. If administrative agencies carefully
consider the comments of the politically influential and parties with
whom they have long-term relationships, while attending only on a pro
forma basis to the comments of ordinary citizens, then the process
merely entrenches the cozy relationship between agency policy-makers
and regulated actors, at the expense of genuine democratic
responsiveness.
Let's look at the empirical literature and at three questions in particular: First, how important is the notice-and-comment period in agency
decision-making? Second, who participates in the notice-and-comment
173. Id.
174. Id. at 16.
175. Email from J. Scott Marcus, formerly the FCC's Senior Advisor for Internet Technology,
to the cybertelecom-I mailing list (Jul. 3, 2009) (on file with author) (quoted with permission).
The political-science literature predicts that, where rules have low public profiles, deep-pocketed
regulated parties will have disproportionate influence on the rule-making process. See William T.
Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY 595, 606-08, 610-11
(1986); THE POLmCS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
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process? And third, whose comments are given serious consideration,
and whose are most effective?
The answer to the first question is that while the notice-and-comment period does make some difference in the content of enacted rules,
that difference is limited. Let's go back to the legal regime governing
agency rule-making. It would not be feasible for an agency to issue a
general, open-ended, notice of inquiry about a particular regulatory
problem-say, "tell us what we ought to be doing to regulate leaking
underground storage tanks"-and then, after reading and processing the
comments it has received, immediately devise and promulgate a
detailed, final rule. It would be infeasible notwithstanding that the text
of the APA explicitly contemplates such a course. Section 553 states that
the notice of proposed rule-making need only set out "a description of
the subjects and issues involved" in the rule-making, as an alternative to
specifying "the terms or substance" of a proposed rule.' 7 6
But it wouldn't work, for two reasons. First, the courts have held
that the notice preceding the final rule must give "fair notice" of the
agency's ultimate action' 7 7-it must provide sufficient warning of what
the agency plans to do, in sufficient detail, to allow "meaningful and
informed" comment.'7 8 Indeed, if the agency changes its mind during
the comment period and adopts a rule different from the proposal, then
participants have been denied their right to offer comments on that
agency action. So unless the final rule is a "logical outgrowth" of the
initial proposal, the agency is required to set the matter for another
round of comment.' 7 9 The key is whether potential commenters were
"sufficiently alerted" to the possibility of the agency's doing what it
ultimately did, so that they were well-positioned to offer comments on
whether it would be a good idea. 8
As a practical matter, this means that an agency engaging in the
rule-making process needs to issue a notice of proposed rule-making
(NPRM) incorporating an actual, specific proposal: "This is the rule we
tentatively plan to enact."'' Absent such a proposal, commenters will
not have enough to react to. Not knowing what the agency is proposing,
they will not be able to offer sufficiently well-focused comments on
176. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006).
177. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174 (2007).
178. Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 1989).
179. Coke, 551 U.S. at 174 (quoting Nat'l Black Media Coal. v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016, 1022 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
180. Nat'l Black Media Coal., 791 F.2d at 1023 (quoting Spartan Radiocasting Co. v. FCC,
619 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980)).
181. There is nothing stopping the agency from issuing more general, open-ended notices
earlier in the process, and on occasion agencies do. But those notices must be followed by one
incorporating the specific proposal.
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whether that course of action is advisable. And the agency, moreover,
has good reason to get its proposal "right" before issuing the notice. If it
decides that its proposal is deeply flawed and needs to be reworked, it
will have to go to the time and trouble of a second round of notice-andcomment once it comes up with its new plan. As a result, agencies seek
to refine rules nearly to their final form before issuing the NPRM.' 8 2
Second, even without regard to these concerns, an agency has
strong incentive to work out a specific proposed rule before issuing the
notice. 18 3 The notice-and-comment period, after all, is its last chance to
get the rule's details correct. The agency wants to get the final rule right,
in its implementation details as well as in broad brush, both as a matter
of professional commitment (what are rule-making staff for, if not to
come up with sound, well-reasoned rules?) and in order to avoid judicial
reversal. 184 It has the best chance of getting the implementation details
right if it makes them public in advance of the comment period so that
commenters can identify objections and flaws, rather than issuing a
notice phrased in general terms and hiding its cards until the comment
period is over.
For both these reasons, it's routine for agencies to work out specific, highly detailed proposed rules in advance of issuing their notices
of proposed rule-making, and then to use the comment period to get
reactions to those rules. But that presents a further challenge: How is the
agency to get the proposal right? The answer is that agencies routinely
have extensive contacts, both formal and informal, with regulated parties
in the pre-proposal stage.' 8 5 Most of these contacts are nonpublic and
undocumented. 86 They happen because the agency knows that those
contacts are important if it is to generate sound, politically viable pro1 87

posed rules.

The agency may send out formal information requests to industry
members, prior to the NPRM, in the course of formulating its rule; those
formal requests may stimulate not only formal responses, but also fur182. Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 110.

183. See id. at 110-11.
184. See id. at I 11.
185. See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in BureaucraticPolicy Making: An InstitutionalPolicy Analysis, 64 PuB. ADMIN.
RaV. 66, 70 (2004).

186. See id.
187. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT.
REV. 201, 231-32; E. Donald Elliott, Comment, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490,
1494 (1992); Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 110-11; West, supra note 185, at 70; William F.
West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural
Controls, 41 ADMIN. & Soc'y 576, 585 (2009).
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ther informal contacts between the agency and regulated parties.1 88 A
recent study of ninety Environmental Protection Agency rule-makings
found that in a typical rule-making, there were twice as many informal
contacts prior to the NPRM, as there were comments filed during the
comment period. 8 9 These pre-NPRM contacts, moreover, were almost
exclusively with regulated parties. Industry members "had, on average,
at least 170 times more informal communications docketed with EPA
during the pre-NPRM stage than public interest groups. '
Interview evidence makes clear that these contacts are important to
agencies. An EPA official explained the situation to Cary Coglianese:
We try to bring [industry] in as early as possible on what we are
required to do and request their help very early on and usually this is
appreciated because that way they have input as opposed to EPA unilaterally going out and looking at various textbooks and writing rules
that are ridiculous because we don't fully understand what the hell
we are regulating.t 9 '
The study I just mentioned found that industries and trade associations
were involved in the pre-notice development of nearly every significant
EPA rule, prized for the technical knowledge they could bring to bear.
Public-interest groups, for their part, were not necessarily even aware
that an EPA rule was in development.1 92
There are two important lessons here. The first is that the preNPRM stage is an important one in rule development, one in which regulated parties have outsize influence. The second is that the pre-NPRM
phase alters the focus of notice-and-comment. The notice-and-comment
process comes only after the agency has invested significant time and
19 3
effort in developing its proposal and building consensus around it.
The agency may be reluctant at that point to contemplate fundamental
changes (possibly requiring another comment round). 194 The "more
pressure agencies have felt to complete the bulk of their work prior to
the onset of the rule-making process," "the less flexibility they show
188. Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 125.
189. Id. at 124. This figure excludes pre-NPRM formal information requests and responses;
with those included, the ratio would be about four to one. See id.at 125.
190. Id. at 125.
191. Id. at 126 (quoting Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in
the Administrative Process 38-39 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan)). Industry members, for their part, rate pre-NPRM contacts as among the most effective
forms of rule-making participation, more so than filing comments. See Scott R. Furlong &
Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participationin Rule Making: A Decade of Change, 15 J.
PUB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 353, 364 (2005).

192. Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 126-27, 143.
193. See West, supra note 185, at 67, 72-73.
194. See id. at 72.
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during rule-making to respond to the concerns of affected parties."' 195
For these reasons, former EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott
emphasized that one needs to look to the pre-NPRM process to see "the
kind of back and forth dialogue in which minds (and rules) are really

changed." 196
The bottom line? Any analysis of notice-and-comment must take
into account that the notice-and-comment period is only one of several
phases in the rule-making process in which the agency shares information and views with people outside the government and receives comment and proposals. Those other phases are not marked by the same

openness to all comers as notice-and-comment, or the same transparency. In particular, there is reason to think that agencies tentatively
decide fundamental issues earlier in the rule-making process and are

reluctant to revisit them during notice-and-comment; rather, in that
period, their focus shifts to implementation details.
One might suppose that agencies ignore comments entirely in their
decision-making about a rule's substance and attend to them only in

drafting the rule's formal justification. 197 Top decision-makers, after all,
never see the vast majority of comments. 198 Staff will read comments

and draft a summary report for their superiors' benefit, but that document may not make its way up the chain of command until well after the

key decisions have been made.' 99 In rule-makings drawing a large number of comments, agencies may farm the comments out to outside contractors to read and summarize, and top agency decision-makers will see

no more than a staff summary of the contractor's summary." ° How
influential, then, could comments be?20 1
Yet empirical studies show that the notice-and-comment process
195. Barron & Kagan, supra note 187, at 231-32; see also Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuiE L.J. 1385, 1390 (1992).
196. Elliott, supra note 187, at 1495. Nor is the pre-NPRM period the only one shrouded from
public view in which certain participants can have outsize influence on the substance of rules.
Under procedures first put in place in 1981, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
reviews all "major" rules, and all notices proposing such rules, before they can be published. See
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993), availableat http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf. OMB's meetings with non-government personnel
have been skewed toward industry representatives. See Steven Croley, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 821, 858 (2003). OMB's
intervention has routinely been in the direction of weakening the rule. See Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 72-73, 87 (2006).
197. See Sax, supra note 70, at 239.
198. See Pierce, supra note 70, at 67-68.
199. See id. at 68 n.59.
200. See id.
201. See Sax, supra note 70, at 239.
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does affect the content of rules at least to some degree.

2

Wagner et al.,

for example, found in their sample set of ninety EPA rule-makings that
the agency made changes in connection with just over half of the "significant" issues raised by commenters (that is, the issues that the agency
itself classed as significant).2 13 Yackee's study of forty low-salience
Department of Labor and Department of Transportation rule-makings
similarly found that agencies altered their proposed rules in response to
about half of suggested changes. 2 1 Cu6llar's Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule-making case study reveals that the agency accepted nearly
all of the recommendations raised by industry during the notice-andcomment period.20 5
Nor should that be surprising. Comments are both a source of information to the agency as it seeks to get its rules right and a source of
litigation risk. In the task of crafting a rule that will withstand judicial
scrutiny, it will often make more sense to amend a proposed rule in the
face of a sound objection than to draft an awkward explanation of why
the objection is not well-taken. 2 6 At the same time, though, those
changes don't appear to be fundamental. One study indicates that they
are disproportionately subtractive-that is, they are likely to involve
dropping part of a proposed regulation, reducing its coverage rather than
20 7
extending it.
Who participates in the notice-and-comment process? Historically,
nearly all comments filed in agency rule-making proceedings have come
from organized groups, and the vast majority of those have come from
202. See Steven J. Balla, Administrative Proceduresand Political Control of the Bureaucracy,
92 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 663, 665 (1998); Cudllar, supra note 45, at 463; Susan Webb Yackee,
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on FederalAgency
Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 105, 107-08 (2006). But see WESLEY A.
MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY
BEHAVIOR 157 (1986) (finding, in a study of EPA's technology-based water pollution control
standards, that "[t]he volume of formal industry comments appears to have a highly limited
influence in the rule-making process").
203. See Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 130.
204. See Yackee, supra note 202, at 117-18.
205. See Curllar, supra note 45, at 459-60.
206. See Yackee, supra note 202, at 107-08; see also Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 118,
129.
207. See West, supra note 185, at 73; see also Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 130-31. West
suggests that an agency's changes to a rule following the comment period will often flow less
from the "direct educational effect" of the comments on agency staff than from political
mobilization that transcends the notice-and-comment process. See West, supra note 185, at 71.
Other studies, though, show correlations between the number and unanimity of comments seeking
a particular result and the likelihood that the agency will change its rule in the requested way. See,
e.g., Yackee, supra note 202, at 117-18. In that context, it's hard to tease out the relative
importance to the agency's decision-making process of the comments themselves and that of any
accompanying political pressure.
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industry."0 8 Industry members have been more likely to participate in
any given rule-making 2°9 and have submitted many more comments in
the rule-makings in which they did participate. 210 Looking at ninety
EPA rules promulgated between 1994 and 2009, we find that industry
participated in all of the rule-makings in the sample; public interest
groups participated in slightly fewer than half.2 11 Industry submitted an
average of thirty-five comments in a given rule-making; public interest
212
groups, an average of not quite two-and-a-half.
Whose comments are influential? Two studies here are particularly
salient. The first is Yackee and Yackee's survey of Department of Labor
and Department of Transportation rule-makings, assessing the circumstances under which agencies actually altered proposed rules to make the
changes requested in comments.2 1 3 There was a strong correlation
between the number and unanimity of requests from business commenters seeking a particular change in a rule and the actual changes
made.2" 4 Statistically, business commenters exercised a strong influence
on final rules. 215 There was no such link, though, between the requests
of nonbusiness commenters and ultimate results. 2 6 The authors'
conclusion?
[C]laims of the equalizing effects of notice and comment procedures
on agency outputs are largely misplaced. The agencies in our sample
appear to consistently alter their final rules to reflect the comments of
business interests; on the other hand, we find no statistically significant relationship between nonbusiness/nongovernment comments and
208. See Wagner et al., supra note 108, at 109, 128-29; West, supra note 185, at 71; Jason
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward Business? Assessing Interest Group
Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006); see also Maureen L. Cropper et
al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making,
100 J. POL. EcoN. 175, 187 (1992); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making
Process: Who Participates?Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245,
252 (1998).
209. See Cropper et al., supra note 208, at 187; Golden, supra note 208, at 252; Wagner et al.,
supra note 108, at 108 n.41.
210. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 208, at 133. The advent of "e-rule-making," in which
members of the public can easily submit short comments by email, has changed this ratio.
Members of the public submitted more than half a million comments in the FCC's 2003 rulemaking on media ownership rules. See In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 FCC Rcd.
13,620, 13,624 (2003). Several rule-makings posted on regulations.gov this year have generated
more than 10,000 comments. See Mendelson, supra note II at 1345; see also Cu6llar, supra note
45, at 469-70. I discuss these developments later.
211. Wagner, supra note 108, at 128-29.
212. Id.
213. Yackee & Yackee, supra note 208.
214. Id. at 135.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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changes in the final rule.217
The other piece of the puzzle is provided by Cu6llar. Cullar stud-

ied three recent rule-makings (by the Treasury Department, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Election Commission) in
which the vast majority of comments were filed not by businesses but by
individuals. 2 18 These extensive comments from the general public were
enabled by the agencies' adoption of "e-rule-making" procedures,
allowing members of the public to submit comments electronically,
opening up the notice-and-comment process to much more extensive
public participation. I'll talk about e-rule-making at more length a little
further on. For now, though, I'll focus on Cullar's findings regarding
which comments the agency took seriously.
Two factors were highly significant in affecting whether the agency
adopted the recommendations made in a comment. The first was the
sophistication of the comment: whether it recognized the distinction

between the respects in which the statute constrained the agency and
those in which it left it free to act; whether it included at least a paragraph of text interpreting, and evidencing an understanding of, the statute's requirements; whether it urged a specific change in the agency's
proposed rule; whether it included at least one argument or example supporting the commenter's concerns; and whether it provided legal, policy,
217. Id. For a contrary suggestion unsupported by data, see STEVEN P.
AND

PUBLIC

INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY

CROLEY,

GOVERNMENT

REGULATION

138 (2008)

(hypothesizing that "a public interest group . . . vastly outnumbered in a particular agency
proceeding may nevertheless... find that its views are considered more closely than are the views
of its regulatory adversaries"). See also Golden, supra note 208 (finding agencies resistant to
changing their proposals no matter what the source of suggested changes and seeing business and
other groups as equally uninfluential).
David C. Nixon et al, With Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 59, 67, 72-73 (2002),
found that the SEC was not more likely to accept arguments that it associated in its statement of
basis and purpose with stock exchanges, trade associations or specific companies, than arguments
that were coded, based on their identification in the notice, as "mixed" or "unspecified"; also,
there was no significant correlation between the number of commenters identified in the statement
of basis and purpose as supporting a change, and the SEC's adopting the proposal. Essentially all
commenters in these rule-makings appear to have been regulated parties of some sort or other,
though, and the authors' coding was entirely dependent on whether the agency in its statement of
basis and purpose happened to refer to parties generically as "commenters" or identified them by
name. Id. at 65.
Cropper et al., supra note 208, at 192, found that in rule-makings concerning pesticide
cancellations, the EPA did not favor agricultural growers over environmental groups, but their
study did not examine the success rates of comments filed in the same proceedings by pesticide
manufacturers.
218. More than ninety-eight percent of the comments in the NRC and FEC proceedings were
filed by individuals, as were seventy-two percent in the Treasury proceeding. See Cudilar, supra
note 45, at 442, 448, 456.
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or background information as context for its position. 19 Among commenters who were not directly regulated entities, a one-point increase in
a comment's sophistication (on a five-point scale) corresponded to a
thirteen-fold increase in the likelihood that the agency would accept at
least one of its suggestions.22 °
The second factor was commenter identity. Even controlling for
sophistication, the agency was more likely to accept suggestions made
by business entities than those made by nonprofit/nongovernmental entities or individual members of the public.2 2t
These two factors reinforced each other because nearly all comments from members of the public were unsophisticated.22 2 They did not
include complex analysis; they did not evince understanding of the statutory background against which the agency operated. While some of
them embodied "constructive insights relevant to agencies' legal mandates," they were nonetheless easier to dismiss-by virtue of their lack
of sophistication, they seemed less reasonable, less helpful to agency
staff, and less of a litigation threat.2 23 Seeming more like policy "votes,"
they offered little to agency staff looking for legal and technical analysis. 224 In combination, the two factors meant that comments from the
public went largely ignored.2 25 For the most part, agencies did not feel
the need even to respond because they read the comments as offering
mere preferences or value statements, as opposed to the sort of legal or
factual argument that might-if unanswered-leave the agency vulnerable to a charge of arbitrariness.22 6
It's questionable, then, just how much is left of my earlier theoretical analysis. If agencies tend to make their key regulatory choices before
the notice-and-comment period even begins, in an environment where
regulated parties have the forum to themselves; if the vast majority of
comments are then filed by regulated parties; if agencies are more
responsive to those comments than they are to those filed by members of
the larger public; and if even in those cases where members of the public
do file a large number of comments, agency staff dismiss those com219. See id. at 431.
220. See id. at 478, 479-80. Whether the comment distinguished between statutory
requirements and regulatory options corresponded to a forty-six-fold increase. See id. at 478.
221. See id. at 480-81. Both the "sophistication" and the "regulated party" variables were
significant at the .001 level. Id. at 482.
222. See id. at 443, 449. A few comments from members of the public did articulate more
sophisticated concerns. See id. at 457.
223. Id. at 416, 460.
224. See id. at 460-61, 484; Mendelson, supra note 11, at 1370-71.
225. For other examples of agencies' failure to engage with comments posted by members of
the public, see Mendelson, supra note 11, at 1363-66.
226. See id.
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ments as unsophisticated-well then, it looks silly to talk about the
notice-and-comment process as embodying a "right to be taken seriously" that is democratic in any large sense, that imports dialogic
engagement into the bureaucratic process in a pro-democratic way.22 7
There's one more question to ask, though. As I've noted, the
Internet has radically changed the way that agencies solicit and receive
public comment. Can e-rule-making remedy any of the problems I've
identified? Or will it just enable ever-larger floods of unsophisticated
public comments for agency staffers to ignore?
Beth Noveck (who went on to lead the Obama White House's Open
Government Initiative) argued back in 2004 that internet technology
could enable "better ways of organizing . . .the interpersonal relationships of the rulemaking process"; it could shift the emphasis from "oneoff commenting by individuals or interest groups on a document" to
"repeated interaction, conversation and deliberation" within communities of interest and expertise. 228 This participation would be "more collaborative, less hierarchical, and more sustained. ' 229 To that end,
Noveck suggested that agencies could push information about pending
and completed rule-makings more broadly to subscribing websites and
organizations; that, in the pre-NPRM stage, they could use software to
engage groups of citizens in moderated discussions designed to bring
about deliberation on the problem at issue and the costs of competing
policy solutions; and that, once the draft was promulgated, they could
use similar online discussions to enable constructive discussion of the
proposal.2 30
Federal government electronic rule-making efforts, without question, have improved the rule-making process from the public's perspective. Only a short time ago, the only way to learn about upcoming or
ongoing rule-makings was to pore over Federal Register notices (or to
227. Cudllar suggests that agencies should address these issues by assembling public juries via
random or stratified sampling, providing them with structured information about rules, and tasking
agency lawyers with translating their opinions into sophisticated arguments for the comment
record. See Cullar, supra note 45, at 491. Mendelson urges agencies to commit via "selfregulation" to take individual comments more seriously. Mendelson, supra note 11, at 1379.
Neither seems likely.
228. See Noveck, supra note 12, at 435-36.
229. Id. at 438.
230. See id. at 495-509; see also, e.g., THOMAS C. BEIERLE, RES. FOR THE FUTURE,
DISCUSSING THE RULES: ELECTRONIC RULE-MAKING AND DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION 7 (2003),
available at http://www.rff.org/rfF/Documents/RFF-DP-03-2.pdf; CARY COGLIANESE, HARVARD
UNIV. REGULATORY PROGRAM, E-RULEMAKING: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY

POLICY 15-18 (2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/rpp/erule-making/papersStephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes
reportsfE-Rule-making-Report2004.pdf;
Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participationand Access to Government Information Through
the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 277, 321-24 (1998).
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get one's information from a person or firm that did). Today, all federal
rule-makings are searchable through the web portal at http://regulations
.gov.23 1 Only a short time ago, filing a comment in a federal rule-making
proceeding required filing a paper document with the relevant agency,
and reading other comments required a physical trip to the agency's documents room. Today, members of the public can do both those things by
visiting regulations.gov, at home in their pajamas.
But regulations.gov has not been a panacea. A blue-ribbon ABA
panel found in 2008 that the website "remains neither intuitive nor easy
to use, even for those knowledgeable about rulemaking. '23 2 The rulemaking materials and other information behind the user interface are
"incomplete, inconsistent in quality, and difficult to extract. 23 3
Although regulations.gov has helped increase the volume of public participation in a variety of rule-makings, it hasn't accomplished its goal of
enabling meaningful and informed public participation. 234 Agency rulemakers, for their part, report that their experience with e-rule-making
has not so far provided them with "new useful information or arguments" in the rule-making process.23 5
More fundamentally, simply moving the notice-and-comment process to the Web, without more, will not solve any of the problems listed
above. 3 6 It will not usefully alter public participation.2 3 7 It will not displace the crucial pre-NPRM period or the primacy of regulated parties
during that period; it will not undo agencies' greater receptiveness to
comments filed by business; it will not magically cause comments filed
by members of the public to be more legally or technically sophisticated;
and it will not cause agency staffers to take more seriously comments
that lack that sophistication. At worst, it will merely cause electronic
filing dockets to be overwhelmed by floods of unsophisticated com231. See ABA
POTENTIAL:

THE

COMM. ON THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULE-MAKING, ACHIEVING THE

FUTURE

OF

FEDERAL

E-RULEMAKrNG

3

(2008),

available at http://

ceri.law.cornell.edu/documents/report-web-version.pdf. Initially, only executive agencies were
required to make their rule-makings available at http://regulations.gov. See id. at 12. Exec. Order
No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2011), availableat http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/
Utilities/EO_13579.pdf, extended that direction to independent agencies. Some independent
agencies maintain their own electronic commenting systems as well. See, e.g., http://www.fcc.

gov/comments (Federal Communications Commission).
232. ABA COMM. ON THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULE-MAKING, supra note 231, at 4,

19, 31-32.
233. Farina et al., supra note 11, at 403.
234. Id.; Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participationin Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55
DUKE L.J. 943, 958 (2006).
235. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers' Attitudes about E-Rulemaking, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 465 (2010).
236. See Noveck, supra note 12, at 465.
237. ABA COMM. ON THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULE-MAKING, supra note 231, at 20.
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ments that are then consigned to the bit bucket.2 38
Cynthia Farina and other scholars, in their ongoing "Regulation
Room" project, have worked hard to use Internet capabilities to explore
new forms of interaction in the rule-making process. 2 39 Regulation
Room has sought to mobilize members of the public to participate via
deliberative engagement in Department of Labor rule-makings and to
channel that engagement to the production of sophisticated and useful
comments. The most important lesson from the project so far is the stunning difficulty of those tasks. Merely making potential participants
aware of a given rule-making, and encouraging them to participate, was
a major project. The organizers sought to identify stakeholder communities for each rule, locate the gatekeeper groups and individuals speaking
to members of those groups, and develop and implement targeted messaging, including daily Facebook posting and Twitter tweeting.24 They
monitored blog traffic and contacted interested bloggers by email and
telephone.2 4 ' Exposure in "old" media turned out to be crucially important.24 2 All of this required substantial human time and effort.2 43
The next step was informing visitors about the issues at stake in the
rule-making and how they could participate effectively. This too was
challenging. Members of the Regulation Room team (working from a
pre-release draft of the NPRM) composed a series of Issue Posts for
each rule to summarize the agency's rule-making proposal in readerfriendly language, highlight the questions the agency had asked commenters to address, and break the proposals up into manageable
chunks. 244 Then students trained in law and group facilitation techniques
moderated the interaction, facilitating discussion and mentoring effective commenting.2 45 These steps turned out to be necessary in order to
ameliorate the technical, legal, linguistic, and attentional demands that
rule-making documents make and to address users' ignorance about the
rule-making process and their tendency to cast votes rather than craft
arguments.2 46
In the long-term future, it may be possible for technology to take on
238. See Noveck, supra note 12, at 441-43, 479-81; Stuart W. Shulman, Whither
Deliberation?Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rule-making, 3 J. E-GoVERNMENT
41, 58 (2006).
239. For an overview of other efforts to enable public involvement outside regutations.gov, see
Coglianese, supra note 234, at 960.
240. See Farina et al., supra note 11, at 419-27.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 412.
245. See id. at 412-14.
246. See id. at 416-18, 429-39.
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some of the moderation functions performed in Regulation Room by
human staff. Some other agency open-government projects, moreover,
have yielded positive results: The Department of Veterans' Affairs, for
example, reports some success using a web-enabled platform to receive
and manage reaction to its Gulf War Illness Task Force Report,2 47 and
Noveck's own "Peer to Patent" project is a promising way to crowd
source informed public reaction to proposed patents. 248 But it's hard to
avoid Farina's conclusion that e-government innovation in rule-making
faces huge challenges-it presents the paradox of a transparent, participatory process that, absent huge facilitative effort, offers only a tiny
slice of the population the opportunity for meaningful engagement.24 9
Technology, in other words, will not save us. Rule-making noticeand-comment, however rosily described, is a mechanism whose benefits
will likely continue to flow for the most part to sophisticated, wellfunded entities-primarily businesses regulated by the relevant
agency-with ongoing relationships with the agency. Comments filed
by ordinary members of the general public will still have only limited
effects on the process. Indeed, to the extent that those comments present
only viewpoints, votes, or brief statements of value, without substantial
legal or technical argument or information, the agency need not even
respond to them-from the standpoint of avoiding arbitrary decisionmaking, there will be nothing there that needs response.
I don't mean to suggest in this discussion that notice-and-comment
is valueless. Agencies do read comments. The notice-and-comment process enables higher-quality decision-making by administrators. It genuinely contributes to agency legitimation and provides a thicker fabric of
connection between the agency and the public. But it's important not to
take all that too far. In considering any understanding of dialogic
engagement between government and citizen, we need to take into
account the reality of how notice-and-comment works. And on that
examination, my theory of dialogic engagement comes up short; it's disconnected from that reality.
We're not done, though. I think there's more to learn about that
disconnection. To get there, I'm going to tell an entirely different story.

247. See

LUKENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 29. See also id. at 20-22.
248. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective htelligence, Open Review, and
Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006). See also James Loiselle et al., Evaluation of
the Peer to Patent Pilot Program, (unpublished B.S. thesis, Worchester Polytechnic Institute),
available at http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project- 122109-150816/unrestricted/
usptofinalreport.pdf.
249. See Farina et al., supra note 11, at 416, 447.
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VIII.

HISTORY

I've been describing the right to be taken seriously as a recent
thing, locating it in the Administrative Procedure Act and other postWWI statutes. But to get better perspective on the right to be taken
seriously, it's time to look a lot farther back: to the historic understanding of the right of the people, guaranteed by the First Amendment, "to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. '25 ° The First
Amendment's Petition Clause plays no significant part in modem constitutional law. Rather, the Supreme Court has told us, the right the Petition
Clause appears to grant-that of communicating one's will to the government on matters of public policy-is merely a particular instance of
Modem constitutional
the general right of freedom of expression.
doctrine does not see the clause's language as imposing on government
any obligation to consider and respond to citizens' arguments. 2
In colonial practice, though, and in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the right of petition meant more. The petition right was
not merely a component of the free speech right; it predated the free
speech right, and was independent of it. It was said to be inherent in "the
very nature" of the structure and institutions of a republican government. 3 Petitions were immune from sanction even where their content
would otherwise constitute seditious libel or other criminality. 4 More
importantly for our purposes, the petition right was associated with "an
affirmative, remedial right [to] governmental hearing and response. 25 5
That is, as I'll explain, a citizen's right to petition the government, protected in state constitutions as well as the federal Constitution's First
Amendment, was understood to impose on the government an obligation
to hear, to fairly consider, and typically to respond to the arguments the
citizen's petition raised.
It should be clear why I'm discussing the petition right so under250. U.S.

CONST.

amend. I.

251. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985); see also Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S.
437 (2007) (per curiam), affg in relevantpart Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1130-32
(D. Colo. 2005). The Court in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011), held
open the possibility that there "may arise cases where the special concerns of the Petition
Clause would" call for rights beyond those granted by the Speech Clause but ruled that the case
before it was not one such.
252. See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984); We the People
Found., Inc. v. United States, 485 F.3d 140, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
253. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1887
(1833).
254. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2173 (1998).
255. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the
Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142 (1986).
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stood: It looks on its face much like the modem right to be taken seriously. Each has or had at its center the ability of the ordinary citizen to
speak to government about what substantive regulation or other steps it
should undertake, coupled with a governmental obligation to listen and
to attend to the substance of the communication. I'll set out in this section of my article how the early American Petition Clause right came to
be, and how it came to disappear. In the following, and final, section, I
will suggest what this means for our understanding of the modem right
to be taken seriously.
A.

English Antecedents of the Right of Petition

Petition has its roots in feudal England, first in nobles' petitions to
the King, as recognized in Magna Carta, 5 6 and later in individuals' peti-

tions to Parliament and the Crown bureaucracy. Edward I (1272-1307),
in particular, encouraged the filing of petitions by individuals to bolster
his legitimacy and to create a sense of shared governance.25 7 Under his
reign, Parliament received several hundred petitions each session;
addressing those petitions was one of its most important functions.2 58
Petitioning became a safety valve for public discontent, 259 and Edward
III (1312-77) established the practice that, at the opening of every session of Parliament, the Chancellor would declare the King's willingness
to consider petitions of the people.2 60 Through petitions, subjects registered complaints, sought review of official actions, and suggested
changes in policies.2 6 1

The Parliament of that time should not be seen as a legislative
body; it did not yet intrude on the prerogative of the King to rule. Its key
functions included voting the King supplies to enable him to govern and
presenting him with petitions for the redress of popular grievances.262
Petitioners, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, came
from all segments of society, from nobility to the church to the poor, and
256. See Magna Carta ch. 61 (1215), available at http://www.constitution.org/eng/magnacar.
htm; Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging... ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CN. L. REv. 1153, 1155 (1986).
257. See David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearanceof the Right
of Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 113, 114 (1991). It was also Edward I who formally expanded

Parliament, then an advisory and revenue-raising body to the Crown, to include individuals said to
represent "the Commons." Id.
258. Id.; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.

739, 747 (1999); see also Mark, supra note 254, at 2167 (Petitions "quickly came to dominate
Parliament's calendar-indeed, they often became the legislative agenda.").
259. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 258, at 752.
260. See Smith, supra note 256, at 1155.
261. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2165-66.
262. See RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 9 (1979).
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even included prisoners.2 63 Particularized petitions pleading individual
grievances were referred to auditors, and later to the Chancellor, for
quasi-judicial resolution.26 4
As elected representatives brought private petitions forward to Par-

liament, the House of Commons developed the practice of consolidating
some of them into "common petitions" to the King.2 65 Parliament
declined to act on the King's request for funds until the King had agreed
to redress those grievances; in that way petitions were key to Parlia-

ment's accumulation of power and its development of a legislative process.26 6 A majority of fourteenth and fifteenth century laws were enacted

in direct response to those common petitions.267
Parliament, with an institutional interest in noticing all petitions
that came to it, established procedures to assure that they received
appropriate consideration and response.2 68 While individuals and groups
filing petitions could not dictate government results, they thus had some

power to set the government agenda.
The right of petition became controversial as England convulsed in
the seventeenth century.2 69 Yet by the eighteenth century, the right to
petition for legal change and adjustment was accepted as a key element
of the patrimony of British subjects.27 ° Petitioning was part of the rights
263. See id. at 10.

264. Mark, supra note 254, at 2168.
265. BAILEY, supra note 262, at 10.
266. Mark, supra note 254, at 2167.
267. BAILEY, supra note 262, at 10-11; Frederick, supra note 257, at 114; Lawson & Seidman,

supra note 258, at 747-48; Mark, supra note 254, at 2167-68; Smith, supra note 256, at 1155-56.
268. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 258, at 747; Mark, supra note 254, at 2168; STAFF OF
COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF CONGRESS: MARCH 4, 1789 TO DECEMBER
14, 1795, 3 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter PETIONS].

H.R.

269. As the Civil War approached, there came to be a constant flow of petitions responding to
political controversy, some with thousands of signatures, some presented by riotous crowds, and
some incorporating what was seen as treasonous content. Debates over petition came to be resultdriven. In 1679, Charles II purported to prohibit the circulation of petition for "specious ends" as
tending to "raise sedition and rebellion." 8 WALTER SCOTT, A COLLECTION OF SCARCE AND
VALUABLE TRACTS, ON THE MOST INTERESTING AND ENTERTAINING SUBJECTS: BUT CHIEFLY
AS RELATE TO THE HISTORY AND CONSTITUTION OF THESE KINGDOMS 124 (1812).
Parliament answered that "it is and ever hath been the undoubted right of the subjects of England
to petition the King for the calling and sitting of Parliament and the redressing of grievances" and
"[tihat to traduce such petitioning as a violation of duty, and to represent it to his majesty as
tumultuous and seditious, is to betray the liberty of the subject, and contribute to the design of
SUCH

subverting the ancient legal constitution of this kingdom." Smith, supra note 256, at 1160 (internal
quotation marks omitted). When William and Mary took over the British throne, they accepted the
Declaration of Rights, providing in part that "it is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and
all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal." Bill of Rights (1689), reprinted
in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1971).
270. Smith, supra note 256, at 1156.
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of Englishmen, an "ancient right" of English political life. 2 7 1 By 1829,
we are told, both houses of Parliament "did little else" but debate peti-

tions.272 And Parliament declared in turn that its role was "to provide, as
far as may be, an immediate and effectual redress of the abuses complained of in the petitions. ' ' 273
This petition right grew in the absence of an expansive free speech
right or, indeed, modem democratic structures. Seditious libel prosecu-

tions were used as punishment for disapproved speech in England well
into the eighteenth century.274 Speech that would otherwise constitute

seditious libel, however, was immunized from punishment when it took
the form of petition.2 7 5 The right to petition, thus, did not flow from a
robust pre-existing free speech right, but arose independently of and in
the absence of one. Indeed, the recognized right of petition in the eighteenth century may have bolstered the nascent rights of speech and
assembly, as speakers circulated publications and organized public
meetings in support of petitions.2 7 6
Moreover, the right to petition arose at a time when British government lacked democratic structures and democratic legitimacy; as late as
the American Revolution, some of the largest cities in England still
lacked any parliamentary representation, and only about one in twenty
English adults had the right to vote.27 7 An extraordinarily broad range of

English society participated in petitioning-far broader than the set of
those who could vote for representatives. Petitioning gained importance,
in the seventeenth century and after, in significant part because it provided an avenue for democratic participation, and influence on public
policy, when other avenues were unavailable or problematic.2 7 8
271. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2169.
272. Smith, supra note 256, at 1167 n.82 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Peter
Fraser, Public Petitioning and ParliamentBefore 1832, 46 HIST. 195, 209 (1961)).
273. Id. at 1167 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 PARL. HIST. ENG. 367 (1780)).
274. Id. at 1168-69; see also id. at 1165.
275. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2173. Petition's immunity from sedition law, and its relative
independence from the free speech right, suggests a parallel to the immunity memorialized in the
1689 Declaration of Rights for "the freedom of speech and debates . . . in Parliament." See
SCHWAR-Z, supra note 269, at 43. In both cases, the speakers could be seen as acting in a
constitutional rather than a merely private capacity.
276. See Smith, supra note 256, at 1169.
277. The figure is approximate. Compare KIRSTIN OLSEN, DAILY LIFE IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 6 (1999) (3% of adults) with LINDA COLLEY, BRITONS: FORGING THE NATION
1707-1837 51 (1992) (not less than 14% of adult males, which is to say 7% of adults). Voting was
limited to adult male Protestants meeting property or professional qualifications that varied by
location. In 1761, for example, the town of Bath had only thirty-two eligible voters. OLSEN, supra.
Further, the fact that district boundaries weren't updated to reflect population shifts left some
cities (Manchester, Birmingham) entirely without parliamentary representation. GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 174 (1969).
278. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2169-70. But see 1 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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B.

Petition in the American Colonies and the United States
1.

PETITION IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD

The U.S. colonial story unfolded against that background. The 1641
Massachusetts Body of Liberties declared the right of every man,
"whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free [to appear before] any
publique Court, Councel, or Towne meeting, and... present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information, whereof that meeting hath proper cognizance.' 2' 7 9 Colonists began to petition their
authorities immediately upon their arrival in the new land; the primary
responsibility of colonial assemblies from the start was the settlement of
private disputes raised by petitions.2 8 ° Colonial assemblies, moreover,
appear to have read and responded to essentially all the petitions they
received; that legitimate petitions required official consideration and
response "was so widely held by all classes that it was regarded as
axiomatic."281
Colonial assemblies and magistracies saw a huge variety of matters
brought before them by private initiative. The first recorded government
business in colonial Connecticut concerned a grievance brought by one
colonist that another one had "traded a ...[firearm] with the Indians for
Come."2'8 2 The governing body responded by admonishing the trader,
directing him to retrieve the gun, and enacting the rule that "henceforth
none y t are within the Jurisdic[tion] of this Court, shall trade with the
pistoll or gunn or powder or shott. ' ' 83 The
natiues or Indians any .
first recorded petition in Virginia came less than a month after the landing at Jamestown. 28 4
Petitions addressed a wide range of topics, as diverse as calls for
regulation of tanners so as to preserve work for cordwainers and saddlers, pleas for price controls, requests to redraw parish boundaries, and
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 104-05 (1832) (focusing on the petition right's value as a protection
against executive malfeasance).
279. Mass. Body of Liberties (1641), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 73; see also
Frederick, supra note 257, at 116-17 n.17; Mark, supra note 254, at 2177-78; Smith, supra note
256, at 1170-71.
280. See Higginson, supra note 255, at 145; Lawson & Seidman, supra note 258, at 748. The
Virginia assembly twice, in 1642 and 1644, declared that its primary purpose was the redress of
grievances. Smith, supra note 256, at 1172.
281. BAu-sy, supra note 262, at 36; see also Mark, supra note 254, at 2162 n.20; Alan Tully,
Constituent-Representative Relationships in Earl)' America: The Case of Pre-Revolutionary
Pennsylvania, 11 CAN. J. HIST. 139, 146-57 (1976) (finding that petitions that the Pennsylvania
legislature "ignored or rejected outright ...were few in number"). Bailey adds the caveat that the
Virginia legislature would not consider petitions "worded in an obnoxious or insulting manner."
BAILEY, supra note 262, at 30.
282. Higginson, supra note 255, at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted).
283. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. BAILEY, supra note 262, at 14-15.
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requests for licenses to sell beer. z85 The petitions presented to the 1696
Virginia assembly included "requests for altering the court days in
Accomack County, for reducing the fees charged by clerks of courts, for
preventing horse racing on the Sabbath, for amending the tobacco laws,
for creating a new county, and for building bridges and improving
roads. 2 86 There is reason to believe that most colonial legislation was
enacted in response to petition.2 87 Petitions were the most important
drivers of the assemblies' (uncoordinated, ad hoc) legislative agendas.28 8
A majority of the colonial assemblies combined judicial functions-resolving petitions alleging such things as fraud, unpaid debts,
land disputes, slander, suits for back wages and release from apprentice-

ship, and claims for divorce-with legislative ones. 28 9 An assembly's
judicial caseload was, of course, plaintiff-initiated. It was natural that the
assembly's legislative agenda too would be at least in part citizendriven, and that the assembly would see its larger role at least in part as

one of responding to citizen demands and complaints. The institution of
petition drew no clear line between legislative and judicial response.

The important role of petitioning in colonial assemblies advantaged
285. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2179-90; see also BAILEY, supra note 262, at 17; Tully,
supra note 281, at 142 (petitions relating to bounties for wild animals, vagrancy laws, fish dams
on navigable rivers, and naturalization of immigrants, and seeking a ban on scolding wives).
286. BAILEY, supra note 262, at 19.
287. See Tully, supra note 281, at 145 (52% of laws passed in colonial Pennsylvania originated
in petition); see also Higginson, supra note 255, at 144-47, 150-51 (Connecticut). Of the fourteen
laws enacted by the 1696 Virginia assembly, nine stemmed from petition. BAILEY, supra note 262,
at 19; compare 3 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE 137 (1823), availableat http://
vagenweb.org/hening/vol03.htm, with 3 JOURNALS OF THE HousE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA

65-79 (H.R. Mcllwaine ed., 1913). One of those Virginia petition-prompted statutes recited that
"many great and grievous mischeifes have arisen and dayly doe arise by clandestine and secrett
marriages to the utter ruin of many heirs and heiresses and to the great greif of all their relations."
HENING, supra, at 149. It imposed stiff fines on ministers who solemnized marriages without
publication of banns as set out in the statute, forbade county clerks from issuing marriage licenses
without parental permission, and modified inheritance law to nullify the effects of certain
noncomplying marriages. Id. at 149-51. The House Journal does not recite the circumstances of
the petition, and one can only wonder.
288. See Higginson, supra note 255, at 150. Thus, for example, the Connecticut assembly
responded to a 1675 petition by granting the petitioner a ten-year monopoly on the milling of rape
oil, banning the export of cole seed (the raw material for the mill) from the colony, and
announcing a ten-year public subsidy to whoever would grow the seed. See 2 THE PUBLIC
RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 255 (1852), available at http://www.archive.org/
details/publicrecords02corm.
289. See BAILEY, supra note 262, at 16; Higginson, supra note 255, at 146; see also Christine
A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American
Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1470, 1496 (1998) (noting that the New York legislature did
not exercise private-law adjudicative authority, although it did come to adjudicate claims against
the colony itself); Gordon S. Wood, The History of Rights in Early America, in THE NATURE OF
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 233, 239 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007) (urging
that colonial assemblies "saw themselves more as courts making judgments rather than as
legislatures making law").
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the assemblies in a variety of ways. First, the assemblies' responsiveness
to petitioning was a source of legitimacy for them, as it had been for the
Plantagenet kings. That an assembly was willing and able to extend
relief to aggrieved citizens justified its existence and its claim of coercive authority. Next, assembly responses to petitions provided a way for
the assemblies to extend their own authority and jurisdiction: The need
to provide effective responses to citizen complaints provided a basis for
assemblies' moves into substantive areas not previously understood to
be within their legislative power. 290 Similarly, assemblies relied on their
responsibility to respond to petitions as a weapon in separation-of-powers skirmishes with colonial governors and, indeed, other colonies and
the Crown.2 91
Beyond that, petitioning was important as a means of informing
colonial legislatures' actions. Colonial political and media institutions
were otherwise inadequate to convey to assemblies sufficient information about problems that could or should be addressed. One 1668 petition thus notes that it was offered lest the petitioners' "beeing remoat &
as ovt of sight might too much burie us in oblivion, or want of information might render [the assembly] the les sensible of our condition."2'9 2
Information from petitions did not merely allow the assemblies to take
credit for addressing problems; by conveying the information that the
problems existed, it made it possible for the assemblies to address

them.293
As in England, the petitioning process helped make up for deficiencies in suffrage and political representation. Suffrage in the colonies,
though much more widely distributed than in England, was still typically
restricted to taxpaying, property-holding white males. 94 Yet the right to
petition was not so limited. Colonial assemblies accepted petitions from
those without property, from women, from Indians, from convicted prisoners, and even from slaves. 295 A group of mulattos and free blacks
successfully petitioned the Virginia legislature in 1769 to eliminate a tax
290. See Higginson, supra note 255, at 150. The Connecticut assembly in 1698, for example,
used the mechanism of response to petition to assert control over a group of Pequot Indians, who
might otherwise have been considered subject to British authority. See 4 THE PUBLIc RECORDS OF
THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT

280 (1868), available at http://www.archive.org/streamtpublic

recordsofcOO4conn#page/280/mode/2up.
291. See Higginson, supra note 255, at 151-52; see also Desan, supra note 289.
292. Higginson, supra note 255, at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a 1668
petition from the town of Stonington).
293. See Tully, supra note 281, at 147.
294. See CARL DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST: THE FORCES THAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA
91-92 (3d ed. 1984).
295. See BAILEY, supra note 262, at 41-45; Higginson, supra note 255, at 153; Mark, supra
note 254, at 2181-87, 2190-91. Examples inclide women complaining of a minister's

inappropriate behavior, or, along with men, seeking division of a religious parish. Higginson,
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assessed on black women.29 6 Petitioning provided a path into government, at least on the level of agenda-setting, for those who had no other
public voice-although, in the end, the petitions would be resolved by
officers whom the petitioners had no role in selecting.
That the colonists saw response to petition as a key legislative function is apparent from language in the new states' declarations of rights.
The Delaware Declaration of Rights is exemplary; it not only guaranteed
the right of "every man . . . to petition the Legislature for the redress of
grievances," but added, "That for redress of grievances, and for amending and strengthening of the laws, the Legislature ought to be frequently
2 97

convened.

How should we understand the historic petition right? We tend
today to think of constitutional rights as meaningful only to the extent of
their judicial enforcement. I've seen no evidence that anyone in colonial
America ever brought a lawsuit claiming that the legislature had failed
to consider a petition. But early American thinkers didn't agree that
"law" exists only to the extent of judicial enforceability.29 8 Legislatures
saw their obligations to petitioners through the lenses of both legality
and public policy; they mediated that tension through what Christine
Desan has referred to as the "public faith." The public faith, she
explains,
was the commitment that bound the members of a political community together. It was founded on the pledge by those acting for the
colony-those agents of the community-that they would recognize
and fairly satisfy [public obligations]. The responsibility of legislators to keep the public faith was not enforced in the courts, but in the
public sphere; claimants registered their satisfaction or disapprobation through, most basically, their continued participation in the
activity of the colony.2 99
2.

WHAT PETITION WAS NOT

The right to petition can be contrasted with its upstart cousin in the
supra note 255, at 153 n.74; BAILEY, supra note 262, at 44. Petitions from slaves generally sought
manumission. BAILEY, supra note 262, at 44.
296. See BAILEY, supra note 262, at 44; Mark, supra note 254, at 2185 (footnote omitted).
297. DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 8, 9 (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note
269, at 277 (emphasis added). Other states' declarations contained similar language. See
MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ X & XI (1776), reprintedin SCHWARTZ, supra note 269,
at 281; MASSACHUSETrS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ XIX, XXII (1780), reprinted in SCHWARTZ,

supra note 269, at 343; NEW HAMPSHIRE BILL OF RIGHTS §§ XXXI & XXXII (1783), reprintedin
SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 378-79; NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ XVIII &

XX (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 287.
298. See Desan, supra note 289, at 1481.
299. Id. at 1463.
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new nation: the right of instruction. Instruction was the claimed right of
constituents to direct their representatives to vote and act in particular
ways, as principals instruct agents. 3 ° It thus concerned not a right to be
taken seriously, but a right of popular control.
Instruction was common in colonial politics, particularly in New
England. Its philosophical underpinnings lay in a strand of American
political thought emphasizing that the people were the "sole lawful legislature" and that authentic power lay in the "people-at-large" rather than
in their governmental vessels.3 ° ' One 1783 author thus suggested that
momentous matters should be decided by the entire citizenry, meeting
separately in their parishes, with the legislature "restricted to a punctual
observance of the will of their parishioners. "1302 In any event, he stressed,
representatives must "abid[e] by the direction of their constituents"
rather than being "free to act of their own accord"-for "[w]hat nation
in their senses ever30 3sent ambassadors to another without limiting them
by instructions[?]"
Nine states adopted bills of rights or declarations of rights between
1776 and 1783.304 Of those, seven explicitly protected the right to petition,30 5 and five of those seven also referenced the right of instruction.3 °6
300. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2209; WooD, supra note 277, at 188-92.
301. WOOD, supra note 277, at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). We can see this view
reflected in the 1776 Pennsylvania constitution, which sought to assure popular control through
such means as a requirement that all public bills be published to the people at large, with "the
reasons and motives for making such laws ... fully and clearly expressed in the preambles," and
the bills not enacted until the following legislative session (after an intervening election). See
PENN. CONST. of 1776, § 15. That way, the people had "the perusal, and consequent approbation
of every law" before it went into effect. WOOD, supra note 277, at 232 (quoting PENN. PACKET,
Nov. 26, 1776).
302. Anonymous, Rudiments of Law and Government Deducedfrom the Law of Nature, in 1
AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA: 1760-1805 565, 587 (Charles S.
Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=comstatic
see also
xt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=2066&chapter=188690&layout=html&Itemid=27;
WOOD, supra note 277, at 367-68.
303. Anonymous, supra note 302, at 587 n.** (citation omitted). Others in the colonial period
disagreed, seeing instruction as surrendering deliberation and a search for the common public
good. See WOOD, supra note 277, at 193-96, 370-71.
304. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at x-xi.
305. See DELAWARE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 9 (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note
269, at 277; MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XI (1976), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra
note 269, at 281; MASSACHUSETrS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIX (1780), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 343; NEW HAMPSHIRE BILL OF RIGwrs § XXXII (1783), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 378-79; NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVIII
(1776), reprintedin SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 287; PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
§ XVI (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 266; VERMONT DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS § XVII (1777), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 324.
306. See MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIX (1780), reprinted in SCHWARTZ,
supra note 269, at 343; NEW HAMPSHIRE BILL OF RIGHTS § XXXII (1783), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 378-79; NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGrrs § XVIII
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Pennsylvania's language was typical: "That the people have a right to
assemble together, to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by
address, petition, or remonstrance."3 °7 When eight state conventions
generated proposals in 1788 for amendments to the new federal Constitution, four of those states sought to guarantee a right to petition,30 8 and
three of the four also would have incorporated an instruction right. Virginia's language was typical: "That the people have a right peaceably to
assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their
representatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to
the legislature for redress of grievances. 30 9
(1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 287; PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
§ XVI (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 266; VERMONT DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS § XVIII (1777), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 269, at 324.
Some scholars posit a basic tension between the rights of petition and instruction. While
instruction used the language of command, see WOOD, supra note 277, at 189, they argue that
petition was marked by "hierarchical deference"-a web of reciprocal obligation in which the
petitioner acknowledged the sovereign's authority and the sovereign considered the petitioner's
requests, see Mark, supra note 254, at 2202. The sovereign, possessed of full authority in order to
advance the general good, could be solicited but not commanded. Petitioners tended to frame their
proposals humbly and deferentially, because one of the few legitimate bases for a legislature's
refusing to accept a petition was disrespectful address; the institution of petition thus buttressed

the authority of the officials to whom petitions were directed. See Richard R. John & Christopher
J. Young, Rites of Passage: Postal Petitioning as a Tool of Governance in the Age of Federalism,
inTHE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790s 100, 104 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon
eds., 2002); Mark, supra note 254, at 2201-03. On disrespectful address, see Mark, supra note
254, at 2170 (English practice); BAILEY, supra note 262, at 30 (colonial practice); PETITIONS,
supra note 268, at 5 (congressional practice). St. George Tucker's 1803 annotated edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries supports this thesis by contrasting a petition right "savourling] of that
stile of condescension, in which favours are supposed to be granted," with instruction, "consonant
with the nature of our representative democracy," employing "the language of a free people
asserting their rights." I ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, Note D, § 12 (1803), available at http://www.constitution.org/tb/tldl2000.htm.
The matter, though, is not clear-cut. Others urge that by the eighteenth century the emotional
valence of petitioning shifted so that it too, undertaken by a people imbued with notions of
popular sovereignty, could carry a "hortatory or commanding tone." See Desan, supra note 289, at
1486; LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 25 (2004).
307. PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVI (1776), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra

note 269, at 266. The other four were North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire. See supra note 306. Instruction's prominence in New England declarations of rights
likely flowed from the long tradition of instruction in colonial New England. See WooD, supra
note 277, at 189.
308. See Maryland Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 735 (1971); New York Proposed Amendments
(1788), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra, at 913; North Carolina Convention Debates (1788),
reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra, at 968; Virginia Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra, at 842.
309. Virginia Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 308, at 842;
see also New York Proposed Amendments (1788), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 308, at
913; North Carolina Convention Debates (1788), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 308, at 968.
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Madison's 1789 draft of what was to become the First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution incorporated an explicit petition right: It provided that "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for
their common good, and to apply to the Government for redress of
grievances, shall not be infringed."3 ' The draft's omission of an instruction right stirred debate. Representatives Gerry, Page, Tucker and Burke
argued for the inclusion of instruction, urging that the right flowed necessarily from popular sovereignty.3 '
Most of the members who participated in the debate opposed
instruction. Madison urged that the existing Petition Clause language,
along with the Constitution's new speech protections, was sufficient to
assure that the people could communicate their wishes to their representatives.31 2 A purported right of instruction, he continued, would as a practical matter be nugatory-no formal legal consequences could follow
from a representative's disobeying his instructions.31 3 Moreover,
Madison continued, from the perspective of popular sovereignty,
instruction was "of a doubtful, if not of a dangerous nature"; the relevant
sovereignty was that of the people as a whole, not that of the people of
the particular district that elected a particular representative. 3" 4 Binding
instructions from voters would "risk ...losing the whole system."3 5
Other speakers agreed that a right to instruct representatives would
offend "the principles of the Constitution" and "every principle of justice. 31 6 Not only would it impede republican deliberation, 317 but constituents might instruct their representatives to seek things at which
Maryland, by contrast, limited its proposal to "a right to petition the legislature for the redress of
grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner." Maryland Ratifying Convention (1788), reprinted
in SCHWARTZ, supra note 308, at 735.
310. House of Representatives Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in Schwartz, supra note
308, at 1089. The draft's inclusion of a petition right was uncontroversial. The only cautionary
note was sounded by Representative Gerry, who pointed out that petitioning had been "abused" in
Massachusetts. Id. at 1090. His reference was to Shay's Rebellion, where petitioners marched to
shut down the courts when their demands were not met. See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAY'S
REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 69 (1980) (quoting a contemporaneous

observer for the proposition that "the stopping of the Judicial courts" had been "blended, in the
minds of some people, with the redress of grievances" as a way of "awakening the attention of the
legislature").
311. See House of Representative Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra
note 308, at 1092-96, 1101-02; see also Mark, supra note 254, at 2207-12.
312. House of Representative Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note
308, at 1096.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1097. See also id. at 1101, 1104 (Reps. Lawrence and Sedgwick).
315. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 521 (2001) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 739 (1789)).
316. House of Representative Debates (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note
308, at 1098 (Rep. Stone); id. at 1093-94 (Rep. Sherman).
317. See id. at 1091-94 (Reps. Hartley, Clymer, and Sherman); see also id. at 1094 (Rep.
Jackson; instruction will drive the house into factions).
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"every honest mind must shudder," such as paper currency.3 18 The
House rejected the instruction right by a vote of forty-one to ten.'1 9
3.

PETITION AFTER

1789

U.S. citizens were eager to exercise their First Amendment right to
petition. The more than 600 petitions to the First Congress included32a0
great number of requests for payment of Revolutionary War claims,
but also covered such topics as slavery, tariffs, copyright protection, prohibition of rum, and a ban on "inaccurate editions of the holy bible."'3 2'
Each petition was read on the floor of the relevant House when
introduced.3 2 2 The petition was then referred to an appropriate executive
department, a standing congressional committee, an ad hoc committee
constituted for the purpose, or the Committee of the Whole.32 3 Each of
these, except for the Committee of the Whole, was expected to report
back to the full body. 324 The process was "time-consuming and often

cumbersome. 325 After several weeks of the 1795 session, the "principal
part" of Congress's time had been "taken up in reading [and] referring
326
petitions."
The statistical record makes clear that not every petition to Congress resulted in a report on the merits, but a notable number did.3 27 In
the years 1789-1795, almost two thousand petitions were filed with the
House. 328 A fifth of all petitions were referred to "select" House committees-that is, ad hoc committees comprising three to five members
318. Id. at 1100 (Rep. Vining); see also id. at 1091-92, 1102 (Reps. Hartley and Wadsworth).
319. Id. at 1105. The House, presumably, was self-interested; its members valued their
freedom of action, and were disinclined to be tightly shackled. Regardless of their motivations,
though, their vote was a resounding rejection of the instruction right and its underlying
philosophy.
A 2001 Supreme Court case provides a coda. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001),
concerned a Missouri constitutional provision reviving instruction: It directed members of the
state's congressional delegation to take certain actions in support of a term limits amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, and provided that election ballots would include "DISREGARDED
VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" by their names if they failed to do so. The Court
ruled the provision unconstitutional.
320. See William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the
First Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790s 29, 31, 47-56 (Kenneth R.
Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2002).
321. See id. at 31-41; Abu EI-Haj, supra note 93, at 30.
322. See PETITIONS, supra note 268, at 7.
323. See id. at 7-8.
324. See id. at 11- 12.
325. Id. at 10.
326. John & Young, supra note 306, at 107 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
327. PErITIONS, supra note 268, at 11, 361 tbl.1.
328. Id. at 362 tbl.2.
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appointed for the purpose of reporting on the petition.3 29 Eighty percent
of these petitions were the subject of written reports back to the
House.33 ° A little over half were referred to an executive department; a
petition claiming veterans' benefits, for example, might be referred to
the Secretary of War for verification.3 ' Over seventy percent of these
petitions were the subject of written reports.3 32 Approximately seven
percent of petitions were referred to a House standing committee, and
nearly two percent to the Committee of the Whole.33 3 Approximately
twelve percent of petitions were tabled without being referred, 334 and a
fraction of one percent were rejected or withdrawn.3 35
Notwithstanding the imperfections, what emerges from the numbers is a strong commitment to "the right of every citizen to petition for
a redress of grievances, and the duty of the House to consider such petitions. ' 336 Thus, when in 1799 Representative Harper sought to reject the
filing of a petition challenging the administration of the Sedition Act, on
the ground (he urged) that its claims constituted an "atrocious libel," the
House mandated that the petition be received and referred to committee
in the normal manner. 337 As Representative Gallatin responded, "the
people have ... a right to say, if they choose, that the administration of
justice is corrupt," and "if they do say so, the fact ought . . . to be
inquired into. 3 38
In the first third of the nineteenth century, petitioning provided a
vehicle for mass agitation on subjects ranging from the tariff, to the
annexation of Texas, to the removal of the Cherokee Nation from Georgia, to the legality of the Bank of the United States. 339 After voting,
329. Id. at 8, 361 tbl.1L
330. Id. at 361 tbl.1.
331. Id. at 11, 361 tbl.l.
332. Id. at 361 tbl. 1.
333. Id.
334. Id. The petition seeking a ban on inaccurate Bibles was apparently in this group. See
diGiacomantonio, supra note 320, at 38.
335. PETITIONS, supra note 268, at 361 tbl.l.
336. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1792). Steele, a North Carolina representative, made this
concession while urging rejection of an anti-slavery petition without referral, on the ground that it
was "a mere rant and rhapsody of a meddling fanatic, interlarded with texts of Scripture," tended
"to alienate [slaves'] affections from their masters, and [excite] in them a spirit of restlessness,"
and asserted no concrete prayer for relief. Id. at 730-31.
337. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2957-59 (1799).
338. Id. at 2958; see Higginson, supra note 255, at 157 & n.105 (discussing other petitions
relating to the Sedition Act); Smith, supra note 256, at 1176-77.
339. See Frederick, supra note 257, at 119, 130; Alisse Theodore Portnoy, "Female Petitioners
Can Lawfully Be Heard": Negotiating Female Decorum, United States Politics, and Political
Agency, 1829-1831, 23 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 573, 574, 603 (2003). See also Higginson, supra note
255, at 156-57 (noting petitions to Congress relating to such issues as contested election results,
land distribution, and the abolition of dueling).
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petition was "the primary mechanism for popular involvement in
national politics," and Congress invested the petition mechanism with
"an almost sacred solemnity. 3 4 ° Story's 1833 Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States described petition as "result[ing] from
the very nature of [republican government's] structure and institutions,"
adding that the disappearance of the right to petition would mean that
"the spirit of liberty had wholly disappeared, and the people had become
so servile and debased, as to be unfit to exercise any of the privileges of
freemen." 3 4'
The petition right came under attack, though, in connection with the
slavery debate. Over time, slavery drew more petitions than any other
matter.34 2 The House answered some, tabled others without referral, and
allowed the rest to die a quiet death, without consideration, in a slaveholder-controlled House committee.34 3 With the start of the TwentyFourth Congress in 1835, enormous time was spent arguing about the
antislavery petitions' proper treatment. 34 Southern representatives
urged that the petitions be summarily rejected; as Representative Hammond of South Carolina put it, the alternative was to "sit there and see
the rights of the southern people assaulted day after day, by the ignorant
fanatics from whom these memorials proceed. '345 The question came to
occupy Congress, and the deluge of petitions made normal House busi34 6
ness problematic.
Southerners argued that abolitionists had no right to insist that Congress receive their petitions; once a petition was presented to Congress,
what Congress did with it was in its own discretion.34 7 Defenders of the
petition right, including John Quincy Adams, emphasized the constitutional right of all persons to be heard by petitioning Congress, and the
legislature's obligation-subsumed in that right-"to receive and deter340. John & Young, supra note 306, at 104-05.
341. STORY, supra note 253, at § 1887. Similarly, William Rawle's 1829 A View of the
Constitution of the United States of America said of the assembly and petition right that "[o]f this
right in the abstract there cannot be a doubt." He went on to emphasize, though, that the
constitutional right should be limited to peaceable and lawful-rather than tumultuous and
disorderly-assembly. William Rawle, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 124 (2d ed. 1829), portion available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/
documents/amendIassemblys20.html.
342. See Frederick, supra note 257, at 119. Many of the petitions focused on slavery in the
District of Columbia, a matter plainly within the legislative power of Congress. See id. at 122-23.
343. See 11 REG. DEB. 1137-38 (1835); Frederick, supra note 257, at 117-18; WILLIAM LEE
MILLER, ARGUING ABoUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATrLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 29
(1996).
344. See Frederick, supra note 257, at 124.
345. 12 REG. DEB. 1966-67 (1835); see Frederick, supra note 257, at 120-29; MILLER, supra
note 343, at 33.
346. See Frederick, supra note 257, at 130.
347. See Higginson, supra note 255, at 159; see also, e.g., 12 REG. DEB. 2334 (1836).
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mine upon the prayer of the petitioners."34' 8 Legislative refusal to take
that step, defenders argued, denied popular sovereignty by supposing
that "the people of the United States are not to be reasoned with."34' 9
The House ultimately adopted Southern representatives' desired
rule that antislavery petitions were not to be received.15 ' Abolitionists
responded with ever-greater numbers of petitions, because their rejection
made for good political theater.3 1 The Massachusetts legislature
adopted a resolve declaring the House gag rule, and parallel Senate procedure, "a palpable violation of the Constitution" and a denial of the
indisputable right of any portion of the people of this country, however mistaken in their views, or insignificant in number, at any time
to petition Congress for a redress of grievances, or what to them may
seem such; and [the obligation of] Congress ...to receive all such
petitions, and give them a respectful and deliberate consideration.3 52
The House finally repealed the gag rule in 1844, on the understanding
that antislavery petitions would be buried in committee.35 3
Though petition remained important throughout the nineteenth century, it gradually lost its meaning.3 54 By 1927, a contemporary writer
described petitions as landing in "the waste basket," ineffective in securing legislative action. 5 While it is still possible to file petitions with
Congress today, they are referred to committee without reading or
348. S. JOUrNAL, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 136-37 (1838).
349. 12 REG. DEB. 2331 (1836). Representative Cushing described the rule that the legislature
both receive petitions and consider them on the merits as one of the most basic "principles of
democracy"; he counted the right of instruction as similarly fundamental. See id. at 2330.
350. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-51 (1840) (adopting a resolution that "no
petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of
Columbia, or any State or Territory, or the slave trade between the States or Territories of the
United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way
whatever"); LEONARD L. R1CHARDS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS 176 (1986).
351. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2225-26.
352. H.R. JOURNAL, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1840).
353. See Frederick, supra note 257, at 139.
354. See Abu El-Haj, supra note 93, at 31-33. The conventional wisdom among legal writers
is that congressional consideration of petitions simply ended with the crisis of the 1830s, see, e.g.,
Frederick, supra note 257, at 139, 141, but the evidence doesn't support such an abrupt shift.
Citizens filed hundreds of thousands of petitions with Congress in the years that followed,
presumably on the understanding that they would be read. See John & Young, supra note 306, at
137-38. See also, e.g., A Petition of 22,626 Women of Utah: Petition Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 13, 1875), available at http://www.archives.gov/historicaldocs/doc-contentlimages/utah-statehood-womens-petition.pdf (requesting statehood for Utah);
Press Release, The U.S. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Century-old Hawaiian Petition Now
Available on Microfilm (Aug. 9, 1999), http://www.archives.gov/presslpress-releases/1999/nr99103.html (describing an 1897 petition opposing Hawaiian annexation).
355. Abu EI-Haj, supra note 93, at 35 (quoting LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES 106
(1927)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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debate, and are no longer a significant part of the legislative process.3 5 6

Today's constitutional understanding, moreover, has dropped any
special meaning for the First Amendment right to petition; it is simply
"an assurance of a particular freedom of expression. 3 57 The Constitution imposes no "obligation on the government to listen [or] to respond"
to such speech.35 8 Quite the contrary, the Court has told us: "It is inherent in a republican form of government that direct public participation in

government policymaking is limited. ' 359 When it comes to government
consideration of a contested policy rule, "it is impracticable that every
one should have a direct voice in its adoption. ' 360 Policy-makers might
be well-advised to listen to citizens' opinions, but they have no constitu-

tional obligation to do

so. 3 6 '

Many factors contributed to the death of the historic petition right.
Federal government structure post-1789 did not feature that combination

of functions so conducive to petitioning, in which colonial legislatures
saw little distinction between judicial (plaintiff-initiated) and legislative
business.36 2 As the size of the nation and the scope of government
expanded, it made less sense to think that any citizen could dispatch a
petition to a busy Congress and have it considered. 36 3 Wider suffrage
offered other opportunities for political participation. 364 A House procedural change in 1836, at the height of the abolition controversy, meant
that petitions came to be referred to agencies and committees without
ever being read and discussed on the House floor; at that point, they
356. See Senate Rule ViI, para. 4, availableat http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Rule
VII; House Rule XII, para. 3, available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf;
PETITIONS, supra note 268, at 9.
357. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985); see also Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437
(2006) (per curiam), affig in relevantpart Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1130-32 (D.
Colo. 2005).
358. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam); see supra
notes 251-252. Supreme Court decisions have given the greatest independent force to the Petition
Clause as a protection of the fight to file non-frivolous lawsuits, characterized as petitions to the
judicial branch. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Cal. Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967); see also Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731,
741 (1983).
359. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984).
360. Id. at 284 (quoting Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
361. See W. Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm'n of Conn., 951 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir.
1991).
362. See Higginson, supra note 255, at 157-58; Lawson & Seidman, supra note 258, at 761.
363. See Jeffrey L. Pasley, Private Access and Public Power: Gentility and Lobbying in the
Early Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE INTHE 1790s 57, 60 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald
R. Kennon eds., 2002).
364. See PETITIoNs, supra note 268, at 8-9.
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became more nearly invisible.36 5 And in the wake of that controversy,
House members became more comfortable with simply ignoring
petitions.36 6
More broadly, 367 petition grew out of a pre-liberal political culture
in which the relationship between citizens and governors was one of
organic reciprocal obligation, not of mass politics and electoral control. 368 The petition, in that world, gave the people a non-electoral means
of entry into the legislature's search for the common good, enabling an
"unmediated, personal politics" of reciprocal obligation in which citizens communicated grievances and proposed remedies, and legislators
were to be receptive and responsive. 369 In late eighteenth-century
America, where citizens paid tremendous attention to the question of
what it meant for a government to be legitimate, the right of petition
exemplified prevailing norms of legislative trusteeship.37 °
Prior to the Revolution, there was no distinction between public
and private spheres comparable to today's. There were no providers of
government services and no police. Government was viewed as simply
one property holder in a world of many. Government actors achieved
their ends by commanding or enticing private actions, relying on the
everyday fidelity and participation of citizens. 37 1 The Revolution profoundly changed this, bringing into being an autonomous public sphere
separate from the private one. 37 2 And norms shifted: the old world of
"public faith" began to give way to a new one exemplified by The Federalist's focus on designing public institutions so as to mediate government actors' selfish and ill-motivated actions.3 73 In this new world,
citizens came to interact with government in a new way, not via a relationship of organic reciprocal obligation but as voters and rights-holders.
With the growth of both population and government, American
political culture moved to a greater reliance on voting as the key link
between citizen and government.37 4 Citizens elected representatives, and
365. See id.
366. See id. at 9.
367. The historic right of petition, after all, lost its meaning in state legislatures as well as in
the federal one; that shift wasn't dependent on factors peculiar to the federal government.
368. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2187-90, 2194.
369. LAURA JENSEN, PATRIOTS, SETTLERS, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
46-47 (2003).
370. See Desan, supra note 289, at 1481-82.
371. See id. at 1445-46, 1490; HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER:
THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 11-68 (1983);

Wood, supra note 289, at 238-40.
372. See Wood, supra note 289, at 240-41.
373. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) ("Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.").

374. See Mark, supra note 254, at 2230.
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to the extent that those representatives invaded popular rights, the courts
were available to enforce those rights against the other branches of government. Citizens and lobbyists would still communicate with legislators, sometimes through mass petitions.375 More than a million people
are said to have signed John Birch Society petitions in the 1960s to
impeach Earl Warren.37 6 Opponents of the Affordable Care Act are said

to have delivered 1.6 million signatures to Congress last fall calling for
its repeal. 37 7 But the new petitions were instruments of mass politics,

designed to influence legislators by conveying the message that their
signatories were voters who would weigh the legislators' response at the
polls. Just as the anti-slavery petitioners in 1835 did not genuinely
expect Congress members to rethink their moral views of slavery based
on their letters, these modern petitions were no longer about an expectation of legislative consideration and response.
What took the place of petition? To some extent, it was professional lobbyists-or, as Walt Whitman called them in 1856, the
"[c]rawling serpentine men, the lousy combings and born freedom sellers of the earth. '378 Tabatha Abu El-Haj points instead to the movement
that began in the 1880s for direct democracy-the initiative and referendum, which allowed citizens to put policy proposals on the ballot
directly. 379 These reforms, seeking a more direct, unmediated link
between government and the people, spread to nearly half the states by
1918.380 They adapted the right of petition for a vote-centric age,
allowing citizens to shape the lawmaking agenda-to have their proposals considered on the merits by sovereign authority-without regard to
their representatives' views.3 8 1

IX.

THE FUTILITY OF THE RIGHT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY

The stories I've told in this article, I think, reflect a need deeply
375. See id. at 2228.
376. See Robert L. Brown, From Earl Warren to Wendell Griffen: A Study of Judicial
Intimidation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 28 U. ARK. LrrITLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 4 (2005).
377. See Press Release, House Energy & Commerce Comm., 1.6 Million Petitions to Repeal
ObamaCare to be Delivered to Congress (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://energycommerce.
house.gov/News/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=8967.
378. Pasley, supra note 363, at 61.
379. See Abu El-Haj, supra note 93, at 35.
380. Id. at 36.
381. See id. at 35-38. Initiative today, though, is a tool for the deep-pocketed, far removed
from its populist roots. See California Ballot Initiative Petition Signature Costs, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Califomia-ballot initiative-petition-signature-costs (listing
signature-gathering costs for eleven California ballot measures in 2010, ranging from $987,833 to
$2,626,808). Petition management firms will guarantee ballot access for an appropriate fee. See
Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the American States, in
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS 1, 10-12 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
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encoded in American DNA for government to listen to what we have to
say, to consider it on the merits, and to treat us with respect. From the
very start of the Republic, lawmakers took as a given that "individuals
should be heard in the public councils."3'82 After all, the country was
"composed of individuals. '383 Unless citizens believed, with justification, that Congress would not only receive their petitions but would take
them seriously, then government could not abide.38 4 If the legislature
were not to respect petition, it would deny the respect due to the citizenry as "people . . . to be reasoned with. ' 385 It is that same desire to be
taken seriously that causes us to characterize notice-and-comment as a
democratic institution. The agency's obligation to take commenters'
views seriously speaks to our desire to be taken seriously. We want
bureaucrats to consider our positions in a dialogic way, not to treat us
merely as subjects to be dictated to.
Martha Minow, in another context, emphasizes the communitarian
nature of rights claims: Claims of right are made within and to a community.3 86 Having a right thus depends on the willingness of those in
power to take it seriously; "the rights tradition ... sustains the call that
makes those in power at least listen. ' 387 The right to be taken seriously
in its broadest sense represents the purest form of this principle, as a
right to have those in power listen and consider what one has to say.
And yet the fact is that government bureaucrats and policy-makers
are not necessarily inclined to treat ordinary citizens that way. They
have their own goals and their own agendas. The law does not supply
good tools for requiring them to address us communicatively rather than
instrumentally. Indeed, it cannot.
The historic right of petition was not democratic, but it was-in
certain respects-dialogic. The citizen presenting a petition to Parliament or the Crown had neither threat nor bribe to offer; he could only
present the unforced power of argument. The Crown's attention was the
product of neither threat nor bribe. It was bound to consider the petitioner's arguments (though not to grant them) as a matter of social role.
And yet as the norms that supported the obligation of public consideration and response in early America dissolved, it became clear
that-when push came to shove-the legislature didn't need to consider
382. These are the views of "Candidus," writing in 1790, and quoted in diGiacomantonio,
supra note 320, at 30.
383. Id.
384. Id.

385. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
386. See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essayfor Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860,
1874-80 (1987).
387. Id. at 1879.
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or respond at all. This wasn't an obligation that could have been made
judicially enforceable: Such a judicial role wouldn't have fit our understanding of separation of powers, and in any event it wouldn't have
made a difference. After all, when the House repealed the gag rule in
1844, agreeing once again to receive petitions, it instead simply sent
abolitionist petitions to languish in committee without meaningful consideration. When Congress decided that it would no longer engage with
individual petitions on the merits, there was no way to force it to do so.
Petitioning in America, thus, ultimately became simply part of
instrumental mass politics. In the new age, its transactional nature was
more plain: A petition's signatories implicitly threatened to withhold
their votes if politicians did not heed their demands. As such, though,
petitioning was neither dialogic nor especially effective.
The innovation of the modem right to be taken seriously, as embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act and elsewhere, was that it had a
judicial enforcement mechanism. Under modem law, if an agency fails
to attend and respond to arguments made in rule-making comments, it
can be called to task in court; the court can vacate the agency's action if
not satisfied with its responses. This looks like the engagement of petition updated for a rights-based era, robust and enforceable.3 8 8
But as we have seen, this judicial enforcement mechanism is limited. It only applies to claims sounding in rationality rather than value,
made in sophisticated language by a party that might plausibly seek judicial review. More importantly, the judicial enforcement mechanism cannot require an agency to consider a commenter's arguments with an
open heart and mind; it can only require the agency to undertake the
paperwork burden, after reaching its decision, of assigning some staffer
to recite some plausible reason for rejecting the claim. And I think that
limitation is inherent; we can't address it by tweaking legal requirements. Under a more elaborate set of legal rules, a court might (at some
cost to practicality) require agency staffers to take more meetings with
interested parties or to write longer responses to their proposals. But in
the end, these too would just be paperwork burdens.
388. Notice-and-comment lacks one key feature of petition: The historic petition right was
agenda-setting because the authors of petitions chose the topics for which they invoked legislative
attention. Modem administrative law incorporates some stark agenda-setting mechanisms. See,
e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2006) (providing that any person may petition the FCC to forbear from
enforcing a statutory requirement, and that petition "shall be deemed granted" if the agency fails
to issue a merits-based denial within a year). But those provisions are rare. As the example of the
Consumer Product Safety Act requirement discussed supra note 74 makes clear, they can greatly
impede an agency's efficiency by stripping it of control over its own agenda.
The direct-democracy mechanisms of initiative and referendum promised to carry over the
petition right's agenda-setting function, but ultimately failed as a populist tool. See supra note
381.
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Administrative law's enforcement mechanism, in other words, does
not render notice-and-comment communicative in the Habermasian
sense. Because it's driven by practicalities and litigation risk, it's ultimately instrumental. It's not about the unforced power of argument. And
so it too is neither truly dialogic nor (for most of us) effective.
Why did both the historic petition right and the modem right to be
taken seriously fall short? Because law, at least in its modem incarnation, cannot effectively impose on government a requirement that it
engage with citizens on a human level rather than instrumentally. In
order for a government entity to pay attention to citizens' comments, it
must want to pay attention. If it doesn't want to pay attention, law has
only blunt instruments to mandate that it do so.
In the end, law and politics are an instrumental realm; the dialogic
function of notice-and-comment sits uneasily there. I suggested earlier in
this article that the right to be taken seriously is appealing because it
forces government to respond to citizens dialogically-to respond as if
the relationship between government and citizen were the same sort of
human relationship we have in those aspects of everyday life not driven
by economics or government authority. But that, in the end, is an
attempt to make government act like something it isn't. There's a contradiction in seeking to use an instrumental mechanism to make government act in non-instrumental ways-or, at the very least, to make
government act as if it were acting in non-instrumental ways. That's an
attempt to make our relationship with government more human than it
is, less instrumental than it inevitably needs to be.
The institution of notice-and-comment seeks to simulate a dialogic,
discursive relationship in which government must show the citizenry the
respect of explaining itself-of hearing public comments and responding to them directly. I've suggested that that sort of relationship builds
connection because it creates a sense that governors and governed are
part of a shared community. But the point of judicial review is to compel
agency staffers to write responses to the substance of public comments
by threatening that otherwise they will be reversed. There is no way to
avoid the instrumental nature of that mechanism. And, in the end, that
undercuts the democratic connection that the right to be taken seriously
might otherwise make.
None of this is to deny the benefits of notice-and-comment, or more
generally, of the public's engagement with government policy-making.
The notice-and-comment process has important epistemic value, contributing to more engaged and informed agency decision-making. It allows
people, including ordinary citizens, to have their say before government,
giving them a sense of belonging. It has democratic value to the extent
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the judicial review mechanism can force government decision-makers to
listen and attend to the issues their comments raise. But there are inherent limitations on how well all that can work.
Here's a coda to this discussion, a story that perhaps sums it all up:
The Obama administration, as part of its openness initiative, recently
created the "We the People" petition platform. The platform enables any
adult to submit a short petition seeking changes in "the current or potential actions or policies of the federal government. ' 389 That person then
receives a unique URL to disseminate via email, the web, or social
media in order to get additional signatures; if the petition gains 150 signatures within thirty days, it becomes visible and searchable on the "We
the People" portion of the White House website.39° Under the initial
plan, if a petition received 5,000 signatures within thirty days, it would
receive a response on the merits from policy experts; the White House
later upped that threshold to 25,000 signatures.3 9 '

"We the People" in some respects has been a clear success. In its
first month of operation, it collected over a million signatures on a variety of petitions. Yet difficulties became clear soon enough. As of this
writing, the Administration has declined to comment on twenty-eight
percent of the petitions that crossed the signature threshold, including a
petition that the federal government criminally charge the Floridaacquitted Casey Anthony and another requesting investigation and prosecution of the Church of Scientology. The White House explained that
the petitions concerned specific law enforcement matters or were otherwise inappropriate for response.3 92

Not all of the petitions garnering White House responses, it's fair to
say, related to causes the White House expected or welcomed. The
greatest number of signatures so far (over 150,000 in all) came on a
series of petitions seeking marijuana legalization. 393 Next was a petition
with over 50,000 signatures requesting investigation of alleged
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct in the criminal conviction of Sho389. We the People: Terms of Participation,WHrrE HousE, https://wwws.whitehouse.gov/
petitions#!/how-why/terms-participation (last updated Dec. 6, 2011).

390. Id.
391. See id.; Macon Phillips, A Good Problem to Have: Raising the Signature Threshold for
White House Petitions, WHrr HOUSE (Oct. 3, 2011, 3:13 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
201 1/10/03/good-problem-have-raising-signature-threshold-white-house-petitions.
392. See Official White House Response to: Try Casey Anthony in Federal Courtfor Lying to
the FBI Investigators, WHrrE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/why-we-can'tcomment-0; Official White House Response to: Examine the Government's Failureto Investigate
and Prosecute Church of Scientology Crime, Fraud,and Abuse, WHTE HOUSE, https://petitions.
whitehouse.gov/response/why-we-cant-comment-petition-about-church-scientology.
393. See Gil Kerlikowske, Official White House Response to: Legalize and Regulate
Marijuana in a Manner Similar to Alcohol and 7 other petitions, WmrE HOUSE, https://petitions.
whitehouse.gov/response/what-we-have-say-about-legalizing-marijuana.
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lom Rubashkin, a meat-processing mogul whose case had become a
cause c6lbbre in certain portions of the Hasidic Jewish community.3 94
Next, among the petitions that have received responses so far, were ones
seeking the removal of "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance,3 95
forgiveness of student loan debt, 396 elimination of the Transportation
Security Administration,39 7 and acknowledgement of "an extraterrestrial
presence engaging the human race. '"398
But the subjects of the petitions are not the problem. The problem,
rather, has been the responses. They're the stuff of position papers-the
standard pap that we're used to political office-holders feeding us when
they're trying to be safe, when they're trying to be all things to all people. They are exactly what you would expect a press officer to gin up
when directed to answer a question while putting his boss and the
administration in the best possible light. Nor do I blame the authors,
really-what else could any of us have expected? But it makes the
whole enterprise seem pointless.
You can find, as a result, the following petition on the "We the
People" website. It garnered 37,167 signatures.
We petition the Obama Administration to:
Actually take these petitions seriously instead of just using
them as an excuse to pretend you are listening
Although the ability to submit petitions directly to the White
House is a noble and welcome new feature of the current administration, the first round of responses makes blatantly clear the White
House intends to just support its current stances and explain them
with responses everyone who has done any research already knows.
An online petition is not meant as a replacement for using a
search box in a web browser. We the People, those who grant you the
power to govern in the first place, are requesting changes in policy
394. See Official White House Response to: Call an Investigation into Allegations of
Prosecutorial& JudicialMisconduct in the Case of Sholom Rubashkin, WHrrE HOUSE, https://

wwws.whitehouse.gov/petitions/!/response/why-we-can%E2%80%99t-comment.
395. See Joshua DuBois, Official White House Response to: Edit the Pledge of Allegiance to
remove the phrase "Under God" and 1 other petition, WHiTE HOUSE, https://wwws.whitehouse.

gov/petitions/!/response/religion-public-square.
396. See Roberto Rodriguez, Official White House Response to: Forgive Student Loan Debt to
Stimulate the Economy and Usher in a New Era of Innovation, Entrepreneurshipand Prosperity,
WHITE HOUSE, https:/Iwwws.whitehouse.gov/petitionsll/responseltaking-acfion-reduce-burdenstudent-loan-debt.
397. See John Pistole, Official TransportationSecurity Administration Response to: Abolish
the TSA, and Use its Monstrous Budget to Fund More Sophisticated, Less Intrusive Counterterrorism intelligence, WHITE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/response-wepeople-petition-abolishment-transportation-security-administration.
398. See Phil Larson, Official White House Response to: Formally Acknowledge an
ExtraterrestrialPresence Engaging the Human Race, WHrrE HOUSE, https://wwws.whitehouse.
gov/petitions/!/response/searching-et-no-evidence-yet.
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directly, circumventing legislators who already do not listen to us.
We the People request you govern FOR us, which means actually
listening to us and actually acting in our interests instead of special
interests.
You are not above us. You ARE us. Govern accordingly.39 9

But perhaps this other petition is somewhat more to the point.
We petition the Obama Administration to:
We demand a vapid, condescending, meaningless, politically
vapid response to this petition.
Since these petitions are ignored apart from an occasional
patronizing and inane political statement amounting to nothing more
than a condescending pat on the head, we the signers would enjoy
having the illusion of success. Since no other outcome to this process
seems possible, we demand that the White House immediately assign
a junior staffer to compose a tame and vapid response to this petition,
and never attempt to take any meaningful action on this or any other
issue. We would also like a cookie.4 ° °
X.

CONCLUSION

The right to be taken seriously-the right that government not only
receive citizen comments but also attend to them on the merits and
respond-is rooted in the now-forgotten historical right of petition and
finds expression today throughout administrative and environmental
law. It has a lot going for it. It leads to higher-quality government decision-making. It contributes to government legitimacy. It flows, ultimately, from government's obligation to respect the autonomy and
equality of each citizen, answering citizens with reasons rather than
force, engaging them dialogically rather than instrumentally.
But its promise is muddied in practice. Real notice-and-comment
rule-making doesn't operate as the theoretical model would have it, and
399. We Petition the Obama Administration to: Actually take these petitions seriously instead
of just using them as an excuse to pretend you are listening, WHrrE HOUSE (Oct. 28, 2011), https:/
/wwws.whitehouse.gov/petitions#!/petition/actually-take-these-petitions-seriously-instead-justusing-them-excuse-pretend-you-are-listening/grQ9mNkN.
The White House issued a response, titled "We're Listening. Seriously." The response noted
that, in January 2012, the Obama administration used its response to a "We The People" petition
as a vehicle for announcing a new stance towards legislation aimed at offshore copyright
infringement. It asserted that other petitions had "contributed to policy discussions ... throughout
the Administration," and that petitions had "helped spur discussions" within the White House. Id.
400. See Sean Gallagher, 3,000 Sign whitehouse.gov Petition Seeking "vapid response,"
Cookies, ARs TECHNICA (Nov. 7, 2011, 11:03 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/201 1/
1 l/over-21000-sign-whitehousegov-petition-seeking-vapid-response-cookies.ars.
This petition
expired without attracting sufficient signatures to oblige the government to respond and no longer
appears on the White House website.
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there's good reason to think that it can't. Its democratic justifications fall
short when confronted with reality.
A look back at the right's historical roots begins to explain why.
The historic petition right fell short in the nineteenth century for the
same reason the modem right to be taken seriously falls short todaybecause law could not effectively impose on government a requirement
that it engage with citizens on a human level rather than instrumentally.
In order for a government entity to pay attention to citizens' comments,
it must want to pay attention. If it doesn't want to pay attention, law has
only blunt instruments to mandate that it do so.
The right to be taken seriously is appealing because it promises that
government will respond to citizens dialogically-that is, it will respond
as if the relationship between government and citizen were the same sort
of human relationship that we have in those aspects of everyday life not
driven by marketplace or government authority. Yet today, as in the
eighteenth century, that promise reaches beyond the limits of law. Our
tool for enforcing the right to be taken seriously is judicial review; we
compel the agency to respond to comments by threatening that it will be
reversed if it does not. There is no getting away from the instrumental
nature of that mechanism. And, in the end, that undercuts the democratic
connection that the right to be taken seriously might otherwise make.
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